Arguing that while it is “possible to produce them here” he says that “onerous federal rules make it extremely difficult,”adding that “[w]e cannot sit idly by and hope our U.S. mining industry can cut through the red tape currently strangling it.”

Sen. Risch points to the long-standing and, against the backdrop of surging demand, increasingly dangerous practice of over-relying on foreign – and especially Chinese supplies of critical minerals, which has given our adversaries significant leverage over us. The senator points to China’s penchant for weaponizing the mineral supply chain, with recent examples being the restriction of gallium and germanium exports — key components of semiconductor production and defense technology, arguing that “[i]t is only a matter of time before China decides to punish the U.S. and ur allies again by holding minerals hostage. That will even apply to minerals that are mined in the U.S. but processed in China, like copper.”

Meanwhile, one of the key obstacles to increased domestic mining and processing according to Sen. Risch, is the Biden administration, under whose guise a “working group on mining regulations released recommendations that, if implemented would transition mineral rights to a leasing program and add a dirt tax to every shovelful of ore, regardless of the value of the mineral,” which, according to the senator “would add years to the already lengthy permitting process and stifle investment in mining projects.”

Followers of ARPN are familiar with the average permitting timeframe for mining projects of roughly seven to ten years.  Litigation from NIMBY environmental groups — Sen. Risch points to the Rosemont decision in the Ninth Circuit Court which “changed the interpretation of long-established mining law” and “hampers the industry while making mining significantly less efficient and cost-effective”– can further add years to the already onerous process.

With even U.S. car companies requesting that the Biden administration speed up the mine permitting process, a consensus is growing that reform should be a national priority.

Sen. Risch points to the U.S. Department of Defense being an outlier in the administration and having recognized the “danger we face, which is why it is awarding grants to critical mining projects.”  The senator highlights the stibnite gold project in the central region of his home state of Idaho, where Perpetua Resources is working to be the sole domestic source of antimony, a key component of military technology.

But of course, as followers of ARPN know, there are more projects receiving DoD support with even more expected to be announced on a rolling basis.

In ARPN’s latest post on the blog, we pointed a series of Presidential Determinations involving specific critical minerals which laid the foundation for this type of funding under Defense Production Act Title III authority.

Current projects, recently highlighted by Oregon Group’s Anthony Milewski, include:

• Graphite: a $37.5 million agreement between the DoD and Graphite One (Alaska) to fast-track a domestic graphite mine;
• Antimony (as highlighted by Sen. Risch): two awards — $24.8 million and $15.5 million — by the DoD to Perpetua Resources to secure a domestic source of antimony [an additional conditional award of up to $34.6 million under the existing Technology Investment Agreement was announced earlier last month];
• Lithium: a $90million agreement to secure lithium production between the DoD and Abermarle;
• Nickel: a US $20.6 million agreement between the DoD and Talon Nickel to increase domestic nickel production.

Closes Sen. Risch:

“Every aspect of our society and security relies on processed minerals and would therefore benefit from expedited permitting and easier access. We cannot afford to wait until China reduces or even cuts off our access to critical minerals.

It is time for America to see the power of the U.S. mining industry, invest in it, and secure our supply chains. The technology we depend on every day is only possible because of mining. To ensure not just our economic success but our national security, Congress must revamp our mining laws and substantially reduce irrelevant regulations.”

The stakes are getting higher by the day, and, as ARPN’s Daniel McGroarty pointed out years ago, “we can’t admire the problem any longer” because “we don’t have the luxury of time.” However, we are dealing with Washington, D.C., and the question is whether Congressional stakeholders will finally be able to put policy over politics in an election year.

The post U.S. Senator: Embrace Domestic Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals “Before It’s Too Late” appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Milewski points to Russia having fired an estimated 11 million artillery shells in 2022, the majority of which can contain – depending on shell and manufacturing process – at least an estimate 0.5kg of copper. This, he says would amount to 5,500 tons of copper, or the equivalent of copper used in 1,170 wind turbines.

Copper demand is already forecast to increase by more than 100% by 2035 with many analysts warning there may not be enough copper to meet decarbonization goals in the next few decades after years of underinvestment in the mining industry and falling ore grades.  And those projections, according to Milewski, do not account for surging military demand against the backdrop of increasing geopolitical volatility around the globe.

Of course, copper is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg. According to the National Mining Association, the U.S. Department of Defense uses nearly 750,000 tons of minerals on an annual basis – a number that was calculated around 2016/2017 at a time when the U.S. was not facing any major conflicts.

Fast-forward to 2024 and the U.S. is supporting allies in the Ukraine and Israel while the situation in the Taiwan Strait looks increasing vulnerable.  Meanwhile, particularly ammunition stockpiles are running so low that NATO officials have warned that Western militaries are scraping “the bottom of the barrel” forcing NATO to provide Ukraine with supplies not from full warehouses, but rather “half-full or lower warehouses in Europe.”

The issue is compounded by the fact that production time to rebuild weaponry stocks can take anywhere between three and 18 years, depending on equipment according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies – however that analysis focuses only on manufacturing and production times.

As followers of ARPN well know, supply chains for the metals and minerals underpinning U.S. military technology and munitions are “extremely vulnerable” due to a perennial over-reliance on supplies from adversary nations, i.e. China.

For all the talk about decoupling supply chains in recent years, the needle has not moved much, and the latest USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries still has the U.S. 100% import reliant for 12 metals and minerals, while an additional 29 critical mineral commodities had a net import reliance greater than 50% of apparent consumption — a small drop by two over last year’s report.

However, some important steps have been taken in recent years, and are beginning to bear fruit. Milewski lists several military budget ramp-ups to “try and resolve the massive shortfall.”

As ARPN previously outlined, a notable example of such efforts is the series of (Defense Production Act) DPA Presidential Determinations involving specific Critical Minerals, beginning with President Trump’s July 2019 designation of the Rare Earth permanent magnet supply chain as being “essential for the national defense,” followed by President Biden’s designation of what ARPN calls the “Battery Criticals” as DPA Title III eligible in March 2022, followed by Platinum and Palladium in a DPA Presidential Determination in June 2022.  Earlier this spring, two further Presidential Determinations (February 27, 2023 Presidential Determination, and DPA Presidential Determination (2023-5)), effectively created an entirely new category of critical minerals – “Defense Criticals” as ARPN calls them – by way of designating airbreathing engines, advanced avionics navigation and guidance systems, and hypersonic systems and their “constituent materials” as priority DPA materials.

Those DPA actions, funded by Congressional appropriations, are now producing Department of Defense funded projects to encourage domestic development of these “defense criticals” and their supply chains.

Milewski highlights the following:

• Graphite: a $37.5 million agreement between the DoD and Graphite One (Alaska) to fast-track a domestic graphite mine;
• Antimony: two awards — $24.8 million and $15.5 million — by the DoD to Perpetua Resources to secure a domestic source of antimony [an additional conditional award of up to $34.6 million under the existing Technology Investment Agreement was announced earlier this week];
•  Lithium: a $90million agreement to secure lithium production between the DoD and Abermarle;
• Nickel: a US $20.6 million agreement between the DoD and Talon Nickel to increase domestic nickel production.

He closes:

“We see the U.S. military shifting its position and capacity to secure its critical mineral supply gaining more momentum than it has for arguably the past 30 years. However, the U.S. military is America’s largest government agency, and it will take time.”

However, with conflict brewing in many parts of the world, time is a luxury we do not have, and strengthening critical mineral supply chains should be a key priority for policy stakeholders in 2024.

The post U.S. Military Faces Compounding Problems – Surging Tensions, Depleted Stockpiles, Critical Mineral Supply Chain Challenges appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment, experts argue that the alliance appears to have found a “new lease of life,” with a broadened agenda that “now even includes critical infrastructure protection and climate security.”  However, there are a number of structural challenges that will need to be addressed for NATO to operate efficiently in the current context and successfully navigate crises as tensions around the globe continue to flare.

Writing for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Gregory Wischer zeroes in on the importance of critical mineral supply chains to sustain the alliance’s (and member states’) defense industrial bases and thus military power.

Wischer outlines minerals have always played an important role in this context.

While supply chain challenges are not new – Wischer points to increased manufacturing of bullets and artillery shells causing supply issues for copper and overall increased defense production triggering shortages of manganese, nickel tin and zinc during World War II– the U.S. (and in the post-WWII context the U.S. and NATO) used to navigate these waters from an overall position of strength with strong domestic or intra-alliance production and significant stockpiling of key materials. Fast-forward to today, stockpiles are depleted, and the U.S. and its allies rely on defense industrial bases with severe vulnerabilities, largely in light of an over-reliance on imports to critical minerals from adversary nations like China, key supplier of graphite, REEs and other battery materials, and Russia, from where much of the world’s aluminum, nickel and titanium are sourced. (see Figure 1 in the piece for a great visual historical perspective)

Writes Wischer:

“Mineral supply chain risks are rising as the adoption of renewable energy technology increases mineral demand and as the rearmament efforts of the U.S. and allied militaries in support of Ukraine use more minerals. Coupled with limited production and stockpiles, the U.S. and other NATO militaries face three serious risks that could lead to mineral shortages: foreign export controls [see ARPN’s coverage on export controls here]; rising military demand amid great power competition, including the possibility of a U.S.-China conflict; and disrupted sea-lanes. The United States and other NATO countries must act now to address these supply chain risks.”

Wischer suggests that to successfully address the challenges ahead, the U.S. and other NATO members should:

-       increase their mineral stockpiles, prioritizing minerals used by their militaries,

-       expand their efforts to increase domestic mining and recycling of minerals,

-       prioritize  friendshoring production for minerals with limited domestic reserves,

-       consider mineral substitution and rationing to alleviate the pressure on the production of certain minerals.

There are other key structural challenges NATO faces at 75 that are worth discussing, but with the U.S. and NATO allies supporting Ukraine and Israel as tensions over the Taiwan Strait continue to flare, the time to take assertive steps to strengthen the supply chains for the metals and minerals underpinning the security of transatlantic alliance is now.

ARPN will be taking a closer look at several key minerals, steps taken to bolster critical mineral resource security particularly for the military and associated challenges in a forthcoming post later this week. 

The post A Key Challenge Facing NATO at 75 — Securing Critical Mineral Supply Chains to Build Strong Defense Industrial Base appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

For most, there’ll be plenty to talk or fight about, but if you’re in the fourth segment, or are simply looking for a different conversation topic at the viewing party you’re attending, here’s some food for thought and discussion, courtesy of the Minerals Council of Australia. The Council has put together a great wall calendar for this year, the year of the XXXIII Olympiad, visualizing the metals and minerals that make sporting moments possible.

Sports moments covered on the calendar range from the Australian Open in tennis over the U.S. Masters golf tournament to the premier bicycle race in the world, the Tour de France among others.

Not surprisingly, the Super Bowl, which has the Kansas City Chiefs facing off against the San Francisco 49ers at Allegiant Stadium in Las Vegas this Sunday, made the month of February in the calendar.

Take a look at the fun visual of what metals and minerals make up the giant LED mesh screen at Allegiant Stadium, enable the half time show, made the construction of the translucent dome tent possible, went into the motorized retractable turf field, and provide the comforts of a climate-controlled stadium here:

To followers of ARPN, most of the metals and minerals will look familiar because most of them also feature on the U.S. government’s Critical Minerals List (or, in the case of Copper, should be featured on it, as we have frequently outlined.) and make an appearance on the “Blue Wall of Dependency” in USGS’s most recent Mineral Commodity Summaries, as the U.S. is import-reliant for many of them.

With Taylor Swift having become a massive draw for the Chiefs and the NFL, the term “Era” gets tossed around a lot, alluding to the megastar’s record breaking concert series.  Some say Taylor Swift is in her “NFL Era,” many Swifties previously indifferent about football consider themselves in their “Chiefs Era,” and the NFL has been said to have entered the “WAG Era.”  While these labels are subjective and only apply to certain people or groups of people, there is no denying that collectively, we have all entered the Tech Metals Age, to keep with the time period label theme.

Once the motorized turf has been retracted at Allegiant Stadium, the conversation should shift towards securing the supply chains that underpin the technological advances of said Tech Metals Age that allow us to not only enjoy the Super Bowl, the Olympics and the World Series (all of which are also featured on the calendar), but also the conveniences of everyday life, as well as our national and economic security.

The post The “Chiefs Era” in the Tech Metals Age – How Critical Minerals Allow Us to Enjoy the Super Bowl and Other Sports Moments appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Last year, we noted that our coverage of the report coincided with Groundhog Day, February 2^nd.  And just like in the Bill Murray classic movie, in which the clock jumps back to the same day all over again every morning, the Critical Mineral movie appeared to bring us back to a situation of ongoing deep dependency on foreign sourced metals and minerals every year – at least in recent memory.

This year, we’re once again back with a look at the report, and, lo and behold, it’s Groundhog Day all over again – and by the looks of it not only with regards to the date, but also in terms of what we’re seeing, especially on one of the most telling charts of the report – the depiction of U.S. Net Import Reliance, or “Blue Wall of Dependency” as we have dubbed it based on the many blue bars showing our significant degree of import dependence.

While there are some changes from last year’s report, the number of metals and minerals for which we are 100% import dependent stayed the same at 15.  The the number of metals and minerals for which we are 50% or more import-dependent has dropped slightly, after having gone up over the year before — with the new report pegging it at 49 versus 51 in 2023 and 47 in 2022.

When cross-referencing the U.S. Net Import Reliance chart with the 2022 Final list of Critical Minerals, the United States was 100% net import reliant for 12, and an additional 29 critical mineral commodities (including 14 Rare Earth lanthanides, which are listed under rare earths) had a net import reliance greater than 50% of apparent consumption — a small drop by two over last year’s report.

Once more, ARPN  can’t help but observe that the trendlines represent a stark contrast to U.S. import reliance for metals and minerals in 1984, when we were 100% import reliant for just 11 mineral commodities.

A few changes for individual metals and minerals included in the report are notable and significant, particularly in the context of the accelerating global green energy transition:

For the Rare Earths, a key group of tech metals underpinning 21st Century technology and the accelerating green energy transition, our import reliance had dropped from 100% in the 2021 report to “greater than 90%” in the 2022 report.  Last year’s report had, this number back up to “greater than 95%” and it remains at the same level in this year’s report, with rare earth concentrate being extracted in the U.S. currently sent to China for separation.  Once again, a single link lacking in a supply chain continues U.S. dependency.

For Lithium, perhaps the most frequently cited battery tech mineral, and Cobalt, another one of Lithium’s “battery critical” peers, U.S. import reliance stayed the same at “greater than 25%” for lithium, while Cobalt’s number dropped from 76% to 69%.

For Graphite and Manganese, both battery criticals – the USGS report shows both still pegged at an unchanged 100% import reliance, unchanged from last year.

For Nickel, the final battery critical and a new element on the 2022 Critical Mineral List, import-reliance saw a small jump from 56% last year to 57% in this year’s report, after a more significant jump the year before (from 48% to 56%).

Import reliance for Platinum represents one of the biggest changes over last year’s report, which had the metal pegged at 66%. That number increased to 84 percent in the 2024 report.

Another change worth mentioning is the upward trajectory for Copper import reliance. In the 2010s, import reliance for Copper hovered around 30 to 35 percent, but in recent years, that number has gone up.  This year’s report has it pegged at 46%, up from 41% in the 2023 report.  This development that may be of particular relevance as in 2024, the U.S. Government Critical Minerals List is up for another update, on the 3-year timetable codified in federal law, and in spite of the metal’s inarguable growing importance in the context of decarbonization efforts and expert warnings that there may not be enough copper to meet decarbonization goals in the next few decades, the material has to date been left off the whole-of-government list. Congressional efforts to change this may have not succeeded in 2023, but the Department of Energy designated the material a critical material as part of its 2023 Critical Materials Assessment, further raising the material’s clout.

As in previous iterations of the report, China continues to be the elephant in the data room. And against all pledges in recent years for the United States to reduce import reliance on supplies from China, the 2023 Mineral Commodity Summaries lists China 24 times as one of the major import sources of metals and minerals for which our net import reliance is 50% or greater (which is down by one over last year) – and for all the talk about decoupling supply chains from China and against the backdrop of the escalating trade and tech wars between Beijing and Washington (see our coverage here), this continues to be a concern.

Like last year’s report, this year’s Mineral Commodity Summaries report features an expanded chapter on developments in the critical minerals realm, identifying trend lines, and supply chain security and U.S. government critical minerals initiatives as well as critical mineral investments.

Last year we noted that “while the urgency of the need to secure critical mineral supply chains has registered with stakeholders over the past few years, USGS’s findings underscore once more that supply chains in the 21st Century are extremely complex and meaningful change takes time – and the developments of 2022 ranging from increased resource nationalism in the Southern hemisphere over war in Ukraine to rising geopolitical tensions have not made untangling supply chains any easier.”

Since then, the stakes have only gotten higher as geopolitical tensions continue to rise and U.S.-Chinese relations appear to sour, but ARPN’s basic assessment of the situation stays the same.

So, with the report revealing more of the same, and in true Groundhog Day fashion, we revisit last year’s post, in which we stated:

“In Bill Murray’s movie, it took the protagonist several years to realize how to change behavior to break the cycle.  We know by now that to break our cycle of resource dependence, it will take a comprehensive ‘all of the above’ approach to critical mineral resource policy – and stakeholders have come to realize this and have increasingly embraced the concept.  We continue to stand by what ARPN’s Dan McGroarty stated during a congressional hearing in 2019 – ‘we can’t admire the problem anymore. We don’t have the luxury of time.’

If we act swiftly and comprehensively, there may just be a chance that we will wake up twelve months from now not to another Groundhog Day, but to a 2024 Mineral Commodity Summaries that paints a picture of reduced resource dependence.”

2024’s report was not the one to paint that picture, but in light of recent policy developments (see our recap of 2023 here and refer to page 18 – 22 of the report), there is still hope we will be getting closer by the time next year’s Groundhog Day rolls around.  Meanwhile, with apologies to Punxsutawney Phil’s cheery forecast of an early spring, ARPN is projecting another long winter ahead of Critical Mineral foreign dependency.

The post Groundhog Day All Over Again in Spite of Rising Pressures? USGS Releases Annual Mineral Commodity Summaries Report appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Against ever-surging demand scenarios, important progress to strengthen U.S. critical mineral supply chains has been made over the course of the past few years.

However, Peter Cook and Seaver Wang, analysts with the Breakthrough Institute, argue in a new piece that more could be accomplished through separate regulatory framework for this new class of minerals, which would allow for the coherent organization of “individual policies over the long term at scales commensurate with national progress toward a new technological age.”

They argue that because “existing processes do not manage critical minerals apart from other types of mining”policymakers are currently left with “piecemeal actions, like project grants and mapping campaigns.”Meanwhile, “continuing to treat all hardrock mining as a single inseparable bucket may encourage ineffective and unnecessarily broad, industrywide reforms.”

In their piece, Cook and Wang recommend the creation of a regulatory “infrastructure that systematically distinguishes critical minerals management from other hardrock mining, which policymakers can amend or augment as national needs evolve.”  This would, they argue, appeal to labor and industry stakeholders because it would allow for targeted support within the advanced technology sector rather than watered-down broad-based actions across the entire hardrock mining sector.

Ultimately, they say,

“a separate statutory classification and regulatory framework for critical minerals could confer numerous benefits, enabling more efficient proactive review of new mining areas without altering existing strong environmental standards, facilitating direct allocation of funding and staff toward critical mineral project permitting efforts, and allowing policymakers to design policies and regulatory changes that appropriately affect critical and non-critical mineral projects differently.”

They conclude:

“As the mineral commodity industry has evolved over the last 150 years, U.S. policy has adapted to produce our now-familiar separate locatable, leasable, and saleable frameworks. As the country’s economic, political, security, and environmental priorities have shifted over this period, so too have the ways in which the federal government oversees domestic natural resource development.  

This history of the evolution of the existing classifications provides both a template and precedent for modifying these definitions further, as the nation’s needs continue to change. As the United States prioritizes future competitiveness in numerous energy, computing, and other advanced technologies and seeks to revitalize long-neglected domestic supply chains, a new chapter in mineral resource classification seems both timely and appropriate.” 

Food for thought for policy stakeholders looking to strengthen U.S. supply chains as critical mineral demand scenarios continue to soar against the background of heightened geopolitical tensions, and the presidential race in the United States begins to heat up.

The post Food for Thought: More Effective Critical Mineral Resource Policy via a Separate Regulatory Framework? appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

This week, a China Daily editorial zeroes in on provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress on December 22, which prevents the Pentagon from procuring batteries from Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd, BYD Co., and four other Chinese companies.

The China Daily was quick to dismiss the impact of the restrictive measure to “likely be limited given that it is still several years before the ban takes effect” and does not extend to commercial purchases, allowing, for instance, Ford Motor Co. to continue licensing technology from CATL for its electric vehicle batteries,” however, as Anna Ashraf points out in a piece for Benzinga Financial News and Data, “industries and lawmakers often use such rules as guidelines to determine trustworthy materials, products, and companies for their business operations.”

The China Daily piece goes on to accuse U.S. policy makers aiming to curb Chinese influence over U.S. supply chains of “hysteria” arguing that “rather than seeking win-win cooperation with China in the sector that will determine the future of the energy transition, some US politicians have sought to politicize the issue, by unveiling rules aimed at keeping Chinese components out of EVs sold in the US.”

Editors argue that recent high level government working group meetings indicate that “the trend of easing tensions between the two countries still continues, and will not be easily reversed by disruptive moves such as that to curb China’s EV industry boom,” however, over the course of the last few days, the rhetoric of China’s government officials in Beijing and emissaries abroad has a taken a sharper edge, as evidenced most recently by remarks by China’s ambassador to the Netherlands in response to U.S. chip-equipment curbs, telling journalists in an interview that “if the Americans treat us in a hegemonic manner, we will of course respond.”

These remarks follow on the heels of Chinese Ministry of Commerce publicly alleging that the U.S. is weaponizing export controls and using them as a tool earlier this month in reference to questions about Dutch chipmaker ASML, which, per Dutch government directive, has stopped its exports of certain chip components to China, supposedly due to U.S. pressure.

In light of the stakes and the extent of Chinese control over critical mineral supplies, U.S. policy makers’ efforts to bolster domestic supply chains hardly amount to “hysteria,” but rather a growing awareness and willingness to finally tackle an acute challenge, particularly as relations between the Washington and Beijing, in spite of high-level diplomacy and working group meetings, continue to sour.

The U.S. has taken a few steps to reduce its critical mineral supply chain vulnerabilities in recent weeks. The question is, how will China respond.

The post Tit for Tat – Escalation in Tech Wars Continues as China Alleges “Hysteria” and “Hegemonic Manner” on the Part of U.S. appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

As ARPN noted in 2023, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is preparing to invest billions of dollars into the mining sector to harness the potential of more than $1.3 trillion worth of metals and minerals the Saudi government claims are buried in the kingdom in the context of his Grand Vision 2030 plan to transform the Saudi economy.  If successful, he would make mining the so-called “third pillar” of the economy next to oil and gas.

More specifically, the kingdom is looking to secure access to materials ranging from the battery criticals to other 21^stcentury tech metals which are to be processed by new refineries and smelters to feed a “wider industrial network” across the country.

But what does Saudi Arabia’s “plunge into the world of mining” mean for the rest of the world, and especially the United States and its allies?

Thomas Biesheuvel, writing for Bloomberg’s Energy Daily, believes that the emergence of Saudi Arabia will make it “even harder for the U.S., Europe and Japan to secure the battery minerals they want.”

Says Biesheuvel:

“Saudia Arabia crashed into the world mining scene in the middle of last year with a $2.6 billion deal to buy 10% of Vale SA’s base metal unit, beating off competition from Qatar and Japan in the process.

It’s looking to buy more stakes in foreign mining operations through Manara Minerals Investment Co., a vehicle established by the kingdom’s powerful sovereign wealth fund and Saudi Arabian Mining Co. In doing so, it wants to secure metal offtake in return.”

Biesheuvel argues the model is similar to one long deployed by Japan’s commodity trading houses, but Saudi Arabia’s Mantra is state backed, and can “deploy capital with long-term strategic goals in mind.”

He concludes:

“That poses a challenge for countries such as the US, which is rushing to catch up. There have been suggestions the nation could piggyback off Saudi ambitions to secure its own supplies — essentially subcontracting out the heavy lifting.  But Saudi Arabia’s focus is to develop its own industry, and it’s becoming clearer that it will work with any country that helps achieve those goals.”

Reports in the fall of 2023 indicated that auctions for exploration licenses in the kingdom had only attracted smaller players thus far, but ARPN posited at the time that the crown prince’s willingness to take commercial risks might draw in the big players before long.  The buzz around this month’s Future Minerals Forum clearly points in this direction.

Saudi Arabia has clearly taken note that we are leaving the Petro Age, and is taking steps to position itself in a post-Petro Tech Metals Age.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has taken several positive steps to strengthen domestic supply chains, but, with the U.S.-Chinese trade war showing signs of intensifying and other players — like Saudi Arabia — making an emphatic entrance onto the world stage of the resource wars, it is time to cast aside simplistic “not in my backyard,” or “keep it all in the ground” mantras that still appear to hamper U.S. resolve, and to push forward with a comprehensive all-of-the-above critical mineral resource strategy.

The post Saudi Arabia Makes Emphatic Entrance onto Critical Minerals Stage — With Implications for U.S. and Allies appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

ARPN has been keeping a keen eye on U.S.-China relations, but if you needed a visual reminder on why it matters beyond economic and military might, Visual Capitalist is here to help and has released another great chart depicting China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains.

Using USGS data, the expert chart makers have visualized China’s share of U.S. imports for ten critical minerals:

Sometimes a picture says more than a thousand words, but if you need more context, Visual Capitalist also provides some additional context here, and points to USGS estimates that if China were to cut off 40-50% of rare earth oxide production, it could disrupt global supply to the point where it would impact U.S. defense systems advanced component suppliers.

Followers of ARPN are aware of the increasing weaponization of trade in the context of U.S.-Chinese relations, and in particular the role of export controls, such as the ones imposed by China on germanium and gallium, as well as graphite and rare earths.

As such, it comes as no surprise that U.S. policy stakeholders are taking a firmer stance on policies relating to China, particularly in an election year. See our post on the U.S. House vote to overturn the waiver of “Buy America” requirements for taxpayer-funded EV charging stations here. 

However, these waiver requirements are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.  Mandates to source domestically or from allies can only work if there is a framework conducive to harnessing these resources, so this election cycle and beyond candidates and other stakeholders should prioritize strengthening domestic critical mineral supply chains where possible, and friend shoring, where necessary.

As geopolitical flashpoints continue to increase, so do the stakes.

The post A Visual Reminder Why China Matters in the Context of U.S. Critical Mineral Resource Policy appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

But if the summit meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in November of last year was to be “the culmination of a year-long process that calmed the waters,” recent developments underscore the frailty of relations and the potential for conflict.

A recent case in point, as followers of ARPN may recall, was U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’sspeech and subsequent comments at the Reagan National Defense Forum in California late last year in which the Secretary did not mince words, stating: “(…) make no mistake about it, China’s not our friend, and we need to be eyes wide open about the extent of that threat. I am ready to win, and I’m ready to do that with all of you, but it’s time to open our aperture and challenge the way we’ve done business in every way if we’re going to meet the threat China poses.”

When asked if there were other U.S. origin products or types of technologies that the U.S. Government was “looking at in a similar fashion right now” – i.e. would consider imposing export controls on, she said:

“Absolutely, in biotechnology, AI models, AI products, cloud computing, supercomputing. So short answer is yes.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. House of Representatives’ vote last week voted to strike down President Biden’s waiver of “Buy America” requirements for taxpayer-funded electric vehicle (EV) charging stations, indicates that Congress, too, may be willing to take a more confrontational stance towards China only days into the new year.

The waiver had watered down some more stringent rules proposed the Department of Transportation in August of 2022, most notably requirement to manufacture chargers with no less than 25% American-made components by cost.

The U.S. Senate voted to pass the resolution reversing the waiver in late 2023, with U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fl.) leading the charge arguing that “if we’re going to spend $5 billion of taxpayer money to build electric vehicle charging stations for the United States, it should be made by Americans in America using American products.”

While the president is expected to veto the resolution, its passage has several implications.

On the diplomacy level, it underscores the volatility of U.S.-Chinese relations and comes against the backdrop of sharpened rhetoric by China alleging that the U.S. is weaponizing export controls and using them as a tool, as evidenced by recent comments by Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce spokesperson in reference to a question about Dutch chipmaker ASML, which per Dutch government directive has stopped exporting certain chip components to China, allegedly due to U.S. pressure.

And on the resource policy level, it underscores the urgency for U.S. stakeholders to strengthen domestic critical mineral supply chains and diversify sources away from China as Congress takes a harder line on Beijing, particularly with election politics taking center stage and candidates and party committees from both major political parties attempting to tie opponents to China as views of Beijing continue to deteriorate amongst the electorate.

The post As Tech Wars Between U.S. and China Deepen, U.S. House Votes to Overturn Waiver of “Buy America” Requirements for Taxpayer-Funded EV Charging Stations appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.