With coronavirus having exposed the West’s dependence on China for critical medical supplies and drugs, as well as critical mineral resources, it becomes all the more important that we keep an eye on Beijing, which has been flexing its“tentacles” across the globe even as the country was shut down.  

Observers believe that China will look to exploit the phase of coming out of the gate first and effectively being the sole big player in town to solidify its geopolitical position. 

One possible theater for Chinese advances  is the South China Sea, where, according to retired US Navy captain and former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center Carl Schuster “China is exploiting the US Navy’s coronavirus challenges to improve its position in the South China Sea by giving the appearance it can and will operate there at will while the US is hamstrung.”

Another theater is one ARPN has frequently discussed because of its implications for resource policy: The Arctic. 

Chinese engagement in the resource-rich Arctic has increased considerably during the past decade, prompting U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to speak of a “new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic, complete with new threats” urging vigilance on the part of the Arctic Council, where China has obtained observer status because of its self-proclaimed “near-Arctic state” status. Pompeo rebuked said status in May of 2019, stating that “the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. (…)There are only Arctic and non-Arctic states. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing.” 

The United States’ claim to the Arctic, meanwhile, comes via Alaska, which – across a range of metals and minerals — can play a key role in resource supply in the 21st Century, particularly as U.S. stakeholders increasingly realize the importance of alleviating our supply chain vulnerabilities and reducing our over-reliance on Chinese metals and minerals.  

Almost eight years ago, ARPN’s Daniel McGroarty argued: 

“Alaska is America’s foothold in the Arctic. (…) This will prove incredibly important. We don’t see it now, but the strategic resource value of this single state could drive U.S. growth and competitiveness in the decades ahead.”

In the coming weeks and months, the United States must continue its vigorous efforts to contain and reduce the spread of COVID-19, but while we do that, we cannot let our geopolitical guard down, as the resource wars are set to continue. 

The post As China Looks to Move Past Coronavirus Pandemic, Resource War Theaters Come into Focus appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

But while the U.S. gears into action, the global scramble for resources is in full swing.  Case in point:  reports that Russia may be taking advantage of the United States’ shifted focus away from foreign entanglements and may be “following China’s lead and making a splashy bid for influence in Africa.”

For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed dozens of African national leaders for a summit in Sochi earlier this month in what was supposed to “underline the reversal of Russia’s retreat from the continent and demonstrate the country is no longer a defunct World power,” according to Voice of America (VOA). 

Speaking to reporters, a Putin spokesman said: 

“This is a very important continent. (…) Russia has things to offer in terms of mutually beneficial cooperation to African countries.”

According to the Associated Press, Russia “is taking advantage of the Trump administration’s seemingly waning interest in the continent of 1.2 billion people that includes some of the world’s fasted growing economies and a strategic perch on the Red Sea.”

Followers of ARPN are no stranger to recent Russian forays into mineral-rich areas of the world. One need to look no further than the Arctic, where, against the backdrop of the region’s increasing strategic relevance and China’s ever-growing influence, Russia has increased its military commitment and upgraded its old Soviet Arctic military bases. 

In Africa, the Kremlin is looking to revive its relationships from the Soviet era, which were extensive at the time, but cut off abruptly with the collapse of the Soviet Union.   As VOA reports, while trade with African countries has already increased by 350 percent in the past decade, according to Russia’s foreign ministry, the country hopes that the conference will lead to more oil, and mineral resource deals with African states going forward.

To be sure, Russia’s engagement on the African continent pales in comparison to China’s, which has been aggressively tapping the continent’s vast mineral potential by investing hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure projects as part of its One Belt One Road Strategy.

Against this background, analysts argue that Russia’s role in Africa should not be overestimated, as its “involvement in Africa is limited and guided by a combination of unrealistic ambitions and opportunism,” and “U.S. efforts should continue to prioritize addressing those long-standing challenges rather than being reoriented around the far narrower issue of countering Russian actions.”

Neither, however — with the tech wars over which country will dominate the 21 Century Tech Age in full swing — should Russia’s African resource outreach be neglected or ignored. 

The post Against Backdrop of Tech Wars, Russia Seeks to Boost Footprint in Africa appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Invoking President Truman’s offer to purchase Greenland in 1946 as well as Secretary of State William Henry Seward’s 1867 purchase of Alaska — for which he received much ridicule at the time (hence the term Seward’s Folly) — McGroarty argues that while “[a]pparently there’s something in the subject of Arctic land purchases that encourages levity” (…) “[t]here shouldn’t be.”

He recounts how Denmark came to control Greenland in the first place and explains why it has turned into a hot commodity (pun intended):

“the result of imperial expeditions that led to declarations of Danish sovereignty in the early 1800’s.  As for buying Greenland, there’s no evidence the indigenous Inuit of that day were compensated.

Today’s interest in Greenland is what’s beneath the ever-shrinking icecap, as Earth’s temperature warms:  Known resources of at least eight metals and minerals – taken as individual elements, including the rare earths (REEs) and platinum group metals, that’s 29 elements in all, nearly 1/3 of the naturally-occurring elements in the Periodic Table.  That gives Greenland, soon or sometime in the future, a foothold as a major metals supplier to the 21st Century Tech Revolution.

And while the U.S. most emphatically may not be purchasing Greenland, that’s not to say other interested parties aren’t already buying up strategic bits of real estate.”

McGroarty goes on to give examples of China’s “economic diplomacy” in Greenland, a topic we previously explored on our blog as well. His conclusion underscores the significance of the region and the need for more active engagement.

“In other words, Greenland may not be for sale, but its resource riches surely are.  From Truman’s offer to Trump’s Tweets, Greenland is a hot property.  Surely, Secretary Seward would have understood.”

The post McGroarty for the Economic Standard: In the Arctic Resource Wars, Greenland is a Hot Property appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Unbeknownst to many because outside the media limelight, the Arctic has been one of the sites of looming battles and territorial disputes in the resource war theater, with both China and Russia having stepped up their activities in (and relating to) the Arctic circle region in recent years.  The U.S. is beginning to realize the significance of the region and the need for more active engagement. 

As Mark Rosen writes for the National Interest, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s open Challenge of Chinese and Russian Arctic intentions at the May 2019 Arctic Council Meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland “marked a dramatic rhetorical shift in the usual diplomatic line that the United States regarded the Arctic as a venue for cooperation and research and that climate change is the clear and present danger to Arctic security. Climate change unquestionably is altering the Arctic landscape and will have long term effects. However, Pompeo’s statement was a significant expansion of the warning by former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that the United States is ‘late to the game’ in the Arctic and needs to start making policy, security, and economic investments in the Arctic or be left on the sidelines.”

China, with no territorial presence in the Arctic, obtained observer status to the Arctic Council in 2013, and has since included the Arctic into its “new Silk Road Strategy,”with increased diplomacy and investment in the region. China has also participated in various governance and rule-making processes for ship operation and fishing in the region outside the umbrella of the Arctic Council.  And while China’s launch of its first domestically built polar ice breaker — Snow Dragon 2 was delivered earlier last month — was framed as enabling “scientific research into polar ice coverage, environmental conditions and biological resources,” observers have pointed out that the icebreakers are also “useful in testing the feasibility of moving cargo across the Arctic,” as “China’s plans for a Polar Silk Road, as part of its ambitious multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, include developing Arctic shipping routes.”

And then there’s Russia.  As David Carlin observes for Forbes, “[m]any nations have recognized the potential of the Arctic, but few have proceeded as boldly as Russia. The Russian economy derives nearly 20% of its GDP from activities in the Arctic. Russia has defended this investment by increasing its military commitments. Old Soviet Arctic bases are being upgraded and reequipped by Russian forces.” 

Against the backdrop of increasing tension between Russia and the West, and the United States and China, the Arctic’s strategic relevance is increasing, and Greenland — where vast veins of ores and minerals ranging from Rare Earths, Niobium, Tungsten and Antimony to Chromium, Platinum Group Metals, Graphite and Cobalt have been found (in other words, roughly one-quarter of the U.S. Critical Minerals List) — factors big into countries’ decisions to engage in the Arctic.  

The resource race in the Arctic is a manifestation of the tech war over who will dominate the 21st Century Technology Age.   Regardless of whether or not a Greenland deal is a realistic scenario, what is important here is that U.S. stakeholders are beginning to realize the need to assertively stake the United States’ claim in the Arctic and near-Arctic environs.  The other players — those with Arctic territory, and others, like China, with Arctic interests — have made it clear that they will not wait for us.

The post Greenland at the Heart of Resource Race in 21st Century Tech War appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

The recently-released 130-page long declassified version of the Defense Industrial Base Report mention the words “China” or “Chinese”  a “whopping 229 times” – for good reason.  As the Department of Defense argues in the report, “China’s domination of the rare earth element market illustrates the potentially dangerous interaction between Chinese economic aggression, guided by its strategic industrial policies and vulnerabilities and gaps in America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base.”

From a materials point of view, the Rare Earths segment may still stand as the best illustration of Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the resource realm, though a look at Chinese attempts to jockey for pole position in the battery space is equally telling. (In both cases, however, friends of ARPN will appreciate that it’s easier to achieve hegemony when your competitor, as in the U.S.’s case, doesn’t prioritize resource production.)

From a geographic perspective, the Arctic region has increasingly emerged as a central theater for Chinese resource war games. Having obtained observer status to the Arctic Council in 2013, China has stepped up its activity in (and relating to) the Arctic circle region in recent years. In 2017, a document released by the Chinese regime outlined the incorporation of the Arctic into its “new Silk Road Strategy,” with increased diplomacy and investment in the region, while a white paper released this January further emphasized the “importance of economic and scientific development in the Arctic strategy.” China has also participated in various governance and rule-making processes for ship operation and fishing in the region outside the umbrella of the Arctic Council.

Most recently, the Chinese government announced the launch of a new polar icebreaker, Snow Dragon 2.  While framed as “scientific research into polar ice coverage, environmental conditions and biological resources,” Harriet Moynihan, writing for Chatham House, says that “[i]t has not gone unnoticed, though, that China’s new icebreakers are also useful in testing the feasibility of moving cargo across the Arctic. China’s plans for a Polar Silk Road, as part of its ambitious multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, include developing Arctic shipping routes.”

Meanwhile, observers worry that recent U.S. disagreements with Greenland over Thule Air Base, located in the northwestern part of Greenland and home to the 821st Air Base Group, “could open the door for Beijing to swoop in and further realize its Arctic ambitions, according to Greenland media.” Against this backdrop, the growing realization on the part of U.S. stakeholders that the global race for the metals and minerals fueling 21st Century technology and our everyday lives is heating up – as evidenced by DoD’s Defense Industrial Base Report is not only welcome, it is necessary.

As retired U.S. Army Brig. Gen. John Adams wrote for The Hill last week, the “threat of China’s strategy isn’t new, but the results of China’s now decades-long planning and execution is,” and “shocking import dependence on minerals and metals [from China] is merely a microcosm of the problem.”The obvious answer to this growing challenge is a “comprehensive approach to U.S.competitiveness” and resource policy as a whole.  Here’s hoping that once we leave the dust settles after this week’s midterm Congressional elections, policy makers are able to focus on the necessary reforms.  As we’ve argued before — China will not wait for us to get our resource house in order.

The post Chinese Strategy and the Global Resource Wars – A Look at the Arctic  appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

We have reported occasionally about events relating to the Arctic as a theater of the global resource wars — but it appears that a new front has opened up:

According to a recent news story, New Zealand – recognizing an uptick in international interest in the region – is looking to bolster its footprint in Antarctica. Writes RT.com:

“New Zealand is not typically considered a major colonial power, but the country’s recent defense policy statement revealed hidden aspirations of expansion in one geostrategic area in particular: Antarctica.”

The referenced policy statement, which contains numerous references to New Zealand’s role in the region, provides a little more context on why the country is looking to step up its involvement:

“Interest by both state and non-state actors in Antarctica and its surrounding waters will likely grow over the coming years. This will lead to increased congestion and crowding, as well as pressure on key elements of the Antarctic Treaty System, such as the prohibition on mineral extraction. States are planning and building new facilities. The planned Italian runway in Terra Nova Bay could support broader activities by a range of states interested in the region. China has begun work on its fifth base in Antarctica, on Inexpressible Island.  

While an evolved treaty system is likely to remain the key framework for governing activities in Antarctica, difficulty in distinguishing between allowed and prohibited activities under the Antarctic treaty system could be exploited by states seeking to carry out a range of military and other security-related activities.”

New Zealand indeed is neither a major colonial power, nor is it considered a mineral resource power house.  And unlike the Arctic, where the U.S. claim to the region comes via Alaska, we don’t have a direct claim in the Antarctic circle.   However, what matters here is context.  As the RT story goes on to explain, and as the policy statement indicates, China is once more the elephant in the room:

“In August last year, a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned that Australia’s leadership role was being eroded because of long-term under-investment at a time when other countries (read: China) were expanding their influence in the Pacific region. The report went on to warn that ‘China has conducted undeclared military activities in Antarctica, is building up a case for a territorial claim, and is engaging in minerals exploration there.’ According to the report, three out of four of China’s Antarctic bases and two of its field camps are in the Australian Antarctic Territory, further warning that China’s presence there is aimed at competing for resources, including minerals, hydrocarbons, fishing, tourism, transport routes, water and bioprospecting.

The report stated that China’s military activities in Antarctica have the potential to shift the strategic balance that has maintained peace in the Asia-Pacific, as well as in Antarctica, for nearly 70 years.”

With China continuing to jockey for a geopolitical pole position, here’s another good reason for U.S. policy makers to move forward with a comprehensive mineral resource policy overhaul.  And now, it seems the geopolitical resource map will need to extend to Antarctica.

The post A New Theater for the Global Resource Wars?  A Look at Antarctica appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Of course, a new theater of war requires a different class of weaponry — but work on this front started a long time ago.

Writes the Washington Times:

“The notion of space as a battleground, or a staging area for state-of-the-art defense technology, dates back decades. It first came into the public eye with President Reagan’s call for a ‘Star Wars’ missile program. Since then, the U.S. and its global competitors have made dramatic technological strides.”

Laser cannon technology represents one of these “dramatic technological strides.”

As the New York Post reported in December of 2015:

“[W]hile visions of lasers powerful enough to kill people or knock aircraft out of the sky or sink boats have been a staple of sci-fi since ‘Star Wars’ was just a gleam in George Lucas’s eye, laser cannons are only now on the verge of becoming reality.”

The U.S. Defense Department began testing for high-powered silent laser weapons that just need a few short seconds to burn a hole in targets miles away at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in January of 2016.

Of course — followers of ARPN may have been waiting for the “resource angle” in this post, so here it goes: — said weapon technology relies on Rare Earth Elements (REEs), slabs or strips of which are used as gain medium in bulk lasers.

Meanwhile, as Jeffery Green, president and founder of J. A. Green & Company and member of the ARPN panel of experts recently outlined:

“The nation’s only domestic rare earth producer was forced into bankruptcy in 2015 after China suddenly restricted exports and subsequently flooded the market with rare earth elements. Adding insult to injury, the mine was then sold last summer for $20.5 million to MP Mine Operations LLC, a Chinese-backed consortium that includes Shenghe Resources Holding Co. Now, according to MINE Magazine, this same mine is exporting critical minerals to a processing plant in China—because the United States cannot process or refine these materials at commercial scale. Without a dramatic change in minerals policies, the United States will not be able to minimize the economic damage that will come when China decides to leverage its minerals monopolies against us.”

So while a U.S. Space Force, creation of which will require legislation, is certainly going to be subject to much debate and will have many implications, we’re looking at a peculiar conundrum from a resource perspective:

Staving off our “strategic competitor” China, which is threatening our space capabilities, will require the use of the very mineral resources for which China has a near-total supply monopoly. It would appear the stakes have just been raised to overhaul our mineral resource policies.  Are policy makers paying attention?

The post Space Force Plans Raise the Stakes to Overhaul U.S. Mineral Resource Policy appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Mounting tensions over trade with China have brought the Rare Earths issue, with which ARPN followers will be familiar, back to the front pages of American newspapers.

In a new two-part series for News @ Northeastern, Bill Ibelle argues that Rare Earth Metals are one of the “aces China holds in this high-stakes poker game,” and that U.S. stakeholders would be well advised to consider this leverage in policy considerations.

Citing Northeastern University Distinguished Professor of International Business and Strategy Ravi Ramamurti, an expert in emerging markets, who says that “President Trump says he holds all the cards, but China’s monopoly on rare earths is one of the aces,” Ibelle writes:

“A trade war could prompt China to cut off supplies of rare earth metals to American manufacturers. President Trump has already dragged rare earth elements into the conflict by including them on a list of proposed tariffs announced earlier this month.”

While the tariffs must be considered part of President Trump’s stated – and well-intentioned- goal to decrease U.S. over-reliance on foreign metals and minerals, they are not without challenges. As Ibelle points out:

“Efforts to find a new supply of rare earth metals, or devise technologies that supplant the need for them, are still in the early stages.”

And, as ARPN followers know, China will not shy away from playing politics with its near-total supply monopoly  – and the risk of China cutting off supply for the materials the Trump administration is considering to target with tariffs — including, but not limited to REEs — looms large.

To read Ibelle’s full piece, click here.

The post Rare Earths Issue Back in the Mix As Trade Tensions With China Escalate appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

LeBlanc sets the stage using the example of a relatively unknown Chinese phone company becoming the focus of Congressional concern because the Administration was in discussions to lift or modify sanctions on the company linked to the Chinese government.   A Senate committee recently passed legislation blocking the easing of the sanctions imposed on said company with Senators from both sides of the political spectrum, including Sen. Marco Rubio, a Republican representing Florida, and Sen. Chuck Schumer, a Democrat from New York arguing for a tough stance on China.

As LeBlanc argues:

“What the Senate is ignoring or doesn’t know, is it played a rather large part in creating the problem with ZTE.

Not a peep about the reason China dominates the technology manufacturing industry from either side of the aisle in the Senate. It seems both Senators forget the core problem. Yes, communications equipment made in China is probably being used as spying devices and should not be trusted, but environmentalist regulators have made it next to impossible to mine the rare earth elements (REEs) needed to make the equipment in the U.S.”

Indeed, the United States is 100% import-dependent on foreign supplies of REEs to meet domestic needs, which range from military to clean energy applications, communications technology and household gadgetry.  China has long played politics with its near-total supply monopoly, and U.S. efforts to lower our import reliance faltered when a North American mining company sourcing REEs domestically went bankrupt.

LeBlanc argues that an amendment in the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R.5515 by Rep. Mark Amodei (R, NV), which would streamline the permitting process for mining projects, would go far in addressing the REE problem:

“The amendment passed with bipartisan support showing the House understands the problem. Now if the camera hogging Senate wanted to show it was truly serious about the danger of Chinese telecommunications equipment, it should easily pass the same amendment in the Senate version of the NDAA.”

Read the full piece here.

And, for more context on the NDAA discussions, read ARPN Principal Daniel McGroarty’s recent Investor’s Business Daily piece on the importance to make the connection between critical minerals and national defense.

The post America’s Critical Mineral Issues are Largely Home-Grown appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

As USGS National Minerals Information Center scholars Andrew L. Gulleya, Nedal T. Nassar,  and Sean Xuna observe in a new Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences study, resource conflicts of the past “have often centered on fuel minerals (particularly oil). Future resource conflicts may, however, focus more on competition for nonfuel minerals that enable emerging technologies.”

The authors argue that while more and more stakeholders and researchers have acknowledged and are increasingly concerned about the concept of import reliance, “few studies assess import reliance and none compare import reliance of countries concurrently.”

Against this backdrop, Gulleya, Nassar and Xuna measure and compare the current foreign mineral dependence of 42 minerals for the world’s two largest national economies, the United States and China.

Among their key findings:

“We find that China relies on imports for over half of its consumption for 19 minerals, compared with 24 for the United States— 11 of which are common to both. It is for these 11 minerals that competition between the United States and China may become the most contentious.”

“Unless reliance can be reduced through substitution, improved processing efficiencies, increased domestic production, or recycling, the United States and China will increasingly vie for access to overseas assets that produce minerals in [that category]”

“Increasing demand for minerals that enable sustainable and defensive technologies may intensify international resource competition during the 21st century—especially for minerals that cannot be substituted and have highly concentrated production. While improvements in recycling, mineral processing, material efficiency, substitution, and domestic production may alleviate import reliance and resource competition in the long run, such factors are often constrained in the short run by existing technology, existing manufacturing capital, and long development timeframes.”

Policy makers – take note.

The post USGS Scholars Provide Insights into Resource Interdependency and Conflict Potential in New Study appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.