Arguing that while it is “possible to produce them here” he says that “onerous federal rules make it extremely difficult,”adding that “[w]e cannot sit idly by and hope our U.S. mining industry can cut through the red tape currently strangling it.”

Sen. Risch points to the long-standing and, against the backdrop of surging demand, increasingly dangerous practice of over-relying on foreign – and especially Chinese supplies of critical minerals, which has given our adversaries significant leverage over us. The senator points to China’s penchant for weaponizing the mineral supply chain, with recent examples being the restriction of gallium and germanium exports — key components of semiconductor production and defense technology, arguing that “[i]t is only a matter of time before China decides to punish the U.S. and ur allies again by holding minerals hostage. That will even apply to minerals that are mined in the U.S. but processed in China, like copper.”

Meanwhile, one of the key obstacles to increased domestic mining and processing according to Sen. Risch, is the Biden administration, under whose guise a “working group on mining regulations released recommendations that, if implemented would transition mineral rights to a leasing program and add a dirt tax to every shovelful of ore, regardless of the value of the mineral,” which, according to the senator “would add years to the already lengthy permitting process and stifle investment in mining projects.”

Followers of ARPN are familiar with the average permitting timeframe for mining projects of roughly seven to ten years.  Litigation from NIMBY environmental groups — Sen. Risch points to the Rosemont decision in the Ninth Circuit Court which “changed the interpretation of long-established mining law” and “hampers the industry while making mining significantly less efficient and cost-effective”– can further add years to the already onerous process.

With even U.S. car companies requesting that the Biden administration speed up the mine permitting process, a consensus is growing that reform should be a national priority.

Sen. Risch points to the U.S. Department of Defense being an outlier in the administration and having recognized the “danger we face, which is why it is awarding grants to critical mining projects.”  The senator highlights the stibnite gold project in the central region of his home state of Idaho, where Perpetua Resources is working to be the sole domestic source of antimony, a key component of military technology.

But of course, as followers of ARPN know, there are more projects receiving DoD support with even more expected to be announced on a rolling basis.

In ARPN’s latest post on the blog, we pointed a series of Presidential Determinations involving specific critical minerals which laid the foundation for this type of funding under Defense Production Act Title III authority.

Current projects, recently highlighted by Oregon Group’s Anthony Milewski, include:

• Graphite: a $37.5 million agreement between the DoD and Graphite One (Alaska) to fast-track a domestic graphite mine;
• Antimony (as highlighted by Sen. Risch): two awards — $24.8 million and $15.5 million — by the DoD to Perpetua Resources to secure a domestic source of antimony [an additional conditional award of up to $34.6 million under the existing Technology Investment Agreement was announced earlier last month];
• Lithium: a $90million agreement to secure lithium production between the DoD and Abermarle;
• Nickel: a US $20.6 million agreement between the DoD and Talon Nickel to increase domestic nickel production.

Closes Sen. Risch:

“Every aspect of our society and security relies on processed minerals and would therefore benefit from expedited permitting and easier access. We cannot afford to wait until China reduces or even cuts off our access to critical minerals.

It is time for America to see the power of the U.S. mining industry, invest in it, and secure our supply chains. The technology we depend on every day is only possible because of mining. To ensure not just our economic success but our national security, Congress must revamp our mining laws and substantially reduce irrelevant regulations.”

The stakes are getting higher by the day, and, as ARPN’s Daniel McGroarty pointed out years ago, “we can’t admire the problem any longer” because “we don’t have the luxury of time.” However, we are dealing with Washington, D.C., and the question is whether Congressional stakeholders will finally be able to put policy over politics in an election year.

The post U.S. Senator: Embrace Domestic Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals “Before It’s Too Late” appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Milewski points to Russia having fired an estimated 11 million artillery shells in 2022, the majority of which can contain – depending on shell and manufacturing process – at least an estimate 0.5kg of copper. This, he says would amount to 5,500 tons of copper, or the equivalent of copper used in 1,170 wind turbines.

Copper demand is already forecast to increase by more than 100% by 2035 with many analysts warning there may not be enough copper to meet decarbonization goals in the next few decades after years of underinvestment in the mining industry and falling ore grades.  And those projections, according to Milewski, do not account for surging military demand against the backdrop of increasing geopolitical volatility around the globe.

Of course, copper is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg. According to the National Mining Association, the U.S. Department of Defense uses nearly 750,000 tons of minerals on an annual basis – a number that was calculated around 2016/2017 at a time when the U.S. was not facing any major conflicts.

Fast-forward to 2024 and the U.S. is supporting allies in the Ukraine and Israel while the situation in the Taiwan Strait looks increasing vulnerable.  Meanwhile, particularly ammunition stockpiles are running so low that NATO officials have warned that Western militaries are scraping “the bottom of the barrel” forcing NATO to provide Ukraine with supplies not from full warehouses, but rather “half-full or lower warehouses in Europe.”

The issue is compounded by the fact that production time to rebuild weaponry stocks can take anywhere between three and 18 years, depending on equipment according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies – however that analysis focuses only on manufacturing and production times.

As followers of ARPN well know, supply chains for the metals and minerals underpinning U.S. military technology and munitions are “extremely vulnerable” due to a perennial over-reliance on supplies from adversary nations, i.e. China.

For all the talk about decoupling supply chains in recent years, the needle has not moved much, and the latest USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries still has the U.S. 100% import reliant for 12 metals and minerals, while an additional 29 critical mineral commodities had a net import reliance greater than 50% of apparent consumption — a small drop by two over last year’s report.

However, some important steps have been taken in recent years, and are beginning to bear fruit. Milewski lists several military budget ramp-ups to “try and resolve the massive shortfall.”

As ARPN previously outlined, a notable example of such efforts is the series of (Defense Production Act) DPA Presidential Determinations involving specific Critical Minerals, beginning with President Trump’s July 2019 designation of the Rare Earth permanent magnet supply chain as being “essential for the national defense,” followed by President Biden’s designation of what ARPN calls the “Battery Criticals” as DPA Title III eligible in March 2022, followed by Platinum and Palladium in a DPA Presidential Determination in June 2022.  Earlier this spring, two further Presidential Determinations (February 27, 2023 Presidential Determination, and DPA Presidential Determination (2023-5)), effectively created an entirely new category of critical minerals – “Defense Criticals” as ARPN calls them – by way of designating airbreathing engines, advanced avionics navigation and guidance systems, and hypersonic systems and their “constituent materials” as priority DPA materials.

Those DPA actions, funded by Congressional appropriations, are now producing Department of Defense funded projects to encourage domestic development of these “defense criticals” and their supply chains.

Milewski highlights the following:

• Graphite: a $37.5 million agreement between the DoD and Graphite One (Alaska) to fast-track a domestic graphite mine;
• Antimony: two awards — $24.8 million and $15.5 million — by the DoD to Perpetua Resources to secure a domestic source of antimony [an additional conditional award of up to $34.6 million under the existing Technology Investment Agreement was announced earlier this week];
•  Lithium: a $90million agreement to secure lithium production between the DoD and Abermarle;
• Nickel: a US $20.6 million agreement between the DoD and Talon Nickel to increase domestic nickel production.

He closes:

“We see the U.S. military shifting its position and capacity to secure its critical mineral supply gaining more momentum than it has for arguably the past 30 years. However, the U.S. military is America’s largest government agency, and it will take time.”

However, with conflict brewing in many parts of the world, time is a luxury we do not have, and strengthening critical mineral supply chains should be a key priority for policy stakeholders in 2024.

The post U.S. Military Faces Compounding Problems – Surging Tensions, Depleted Stockpiles, Critical Mineral Supply Chain Challenges appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Last year, we noted that our coverage of the report coincided with Groundhog Day, February 2^nd.  And just like in the Bill Murray classic movie, in which the clock jumps back to the same day all over again every morning, the Critical Mineral movie appeared to bring us back to a situation of ongoing deep dependency on foreign sourced metals and minerals every year – at least in recent memory.

This year, we’re once again back with a look at the report, and, lo and behold, it’s Groundhog Day all over again – and by the looks of it not only with regards to the date, but also in terms of what we’re seeing, especially on one of the most telling charts of the report – the depiction of U.S. Net Import Reliance, or “Blue Wall of Dependency” as we have dubbed it based on the many blue bars showing our significant degree of import dependence.

While there are some changes from last year’s report, the number of metals and minerals for which we are 100% import dependent stayed the same at 15.  The the number of metals and minerals for which we are 50% or more import-dependent has dropped slightly, after having gone up over the year before — with the new report pegging it at 49 versus 51 in 2023 and 47 in 2022.

When cross-referencing the U.S. Net Import Reliance chart with the 2022 Final list of Critical Minerals, the United States was 100% net import reliant for 12, and an additional 29 critical mineral commodities (including 14 Rare Earth lanthanides, which are listed under rare earths) had a net import reliance greater than 50% of apparent consumption — a small drop by two over last year’s report.

Once more, ARPN  can’t help but observe that the trendlines represent a stark contrast to U.S. import reliance for metals and minerals in 1984, when we were 100% import reliant for just 11 mineral commodities.

A few changes for individual metals and minerals included in the report are notable and significant, particularly in the context of the accelerating global green energy transition:

For the Rare Earths, a key group of tech metals underpinning 21st Century technology and the accelerating green energy transition, our import reliance had dropped from 100% in the 2021 report to “greater than 90%” in the 2022 report.  Last year’s report had, this number back up to “greater than 95%” and it remains at the same level in this year’s report, with rare earth concentrate being extracted in the U.S. currently sent to China for separation.  Once again, a single link lacking in a supply chain continues U.S. dependency.

For Lithium, perhaps the most frequently cited battery tech mineral, and Cobalt, another one of Lithium’s “battery critical” peers, U.S. import reliance stayed the same at “greater than 25%” for lithium, while Cobalt’s number dropped from 76% to 69%.

For Graphite and Manganese, both battery criticals – the USGS report shows both still pegged at an unchanged 100% import reliance, unchanged from last year.

For Nickel, the final battery critical and a new element on the 2022 Critical Mineral List, import-reliance saw a small jump from 56% last year to 57% in this year’s report, after a more significant jump the year before (from 48% to 56%).

Import reliance for Platinum represents one of the biggest changes over last year’s report, which had the metal pegged at 66%. That number increased to 84 percent in the 2024 report.

Another change worth mentioning is the upward trajectory for Copper import reliance. In the 2010s, import reliance for Copper hovered around 30 to 35 percent, but in recent years, that number has gone up.  This year’s report has it pegged at 46%, up from 41% in the 2023 report.  This development that may be of particular relevance as in 2024, the U.S. Government Critical Minerals List is up for another update, on the 3-year timetable codified in federal law, and in spite of the metal’s inarguable growing importance in the context of decarbonization efforts and expert warnings that there may not be enough copper to meet decarbonization goals in the next few decades, the material has to date been left off the whole-of-government list. Congressional efforts to change this may have not succeeded in 2023, but the Department of Energy designated the material a critical material as part of its 2023 Critical Materials Assessment, further raising the material’s clout.

As in previous iterations of the report, China continues to be the elephant in the data room. And against all pledges in recent years for the United States to reduce import reliance on supplies from China, the 2023 Mineral Commodity Summaries lists China 24 times as one of the major import sources of metals and minerals for which our net import reliance is 50% or greater (which is down by one over last year) – and for all the talk about decoupling supply chains from China and against the backdrop of the escalating trade and tech wars between Beijing and Washington (see our coverage here), this continues to be a concern.

Like last year’s report, this year’s Mineral Commodity Summaries report features an expanded chapter on developments in the critical minerals realm, identifying trend lines, and supply chain security and U.S. government critical minerals initiatives as well as critical mineral investments.

Last year we noted that “while the urgency of the need to secure critical mineral supply chains has registered with stakeholders over the past few years, USGS’s findings underscore once more that supply chains in the 21st Century are extremely complex and meaningful change takes time – and the developments of 2022 ranging from increased resource nationalism in the Southern hemisphere over war in Ukraine to rising geopolitical tensions have not made untangling supply chains any easier.”

Since then, the stakes have only gotten higher as geopolitical tensions continue to rise and U.S.-Chinese relations appear to sour, but ARPN’s basic assessment of the situation stays the same.

So, with the report revealing more of the same, and in true Groundhog Day fashion, we revisit last year’s post, in which we stated:

“In Bill Murray’s movie, it took the protagonist several years to realize how to change behavior to break the cycle.  We know by now that to break our cycle of resource dependence, it will take a comprehensive ‘all of the above’ approach to critical mineral resource policy – and stakeholders have come to realize this and have increasingly embraced the concept.  We continue to stand by what ARPN’s Dan McGroarty stated during a congressional hearing in 2019 – ‘we can’t admire the problem anymore. We don’t have the luxury of time.’

If we act swiftly and comprehensively, there may just be a chance that we will wake up twelve months from now not to another Groundhog Day, but to a 2024 Mineral Commodity Summaries that paints a picture of reduced resource dependence.”

2024’s report was not the one to paint that picture, but in light of recent policy developments (see our recap of 2023 here and refer to page 18 – 22 of the report), there is still hope we will be getting closer by the time next year’s Groundhog Day rolls around.  Meanwhile, with apologies to Punxsutawney Phil’s cheery forecast of an early spring, ARPN is projecting another long winter ahead of Critical Mineral foreign dependency.

The post Groundhog Day All Over Again in Spite of Rising Pressures? USGS Releases Annual Mineral Commodity Summaries Report appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Against ever-surging demand scenarios, important progress to strengthen U.S. critical mineral supply chains has been made over the course of the past few years.

However, Peter Cook and Seaver Wang, analysts with the Breakthrough Institute, argue in a new piece that more could be accomplished through separate regulatory framework for this new class of minerals, which would allow for the coherent organization of “individual policies over the long term at scales commensurate with national progress toward a new technological age.”

They argue that because “existing processes do not manage critical minerals apart from other types of mining”policymakers are currently left with “piecemeal actions, like project grants and mapping campaigns.”Meanwhile, “continuing to treat all hardrock mining as a single inseparable bucket may encourage ineffective and unnecessarily broad, industrywide reforms.”

In their piece, Cook and Wang recommend the creation of a regulatory “infrastructure that systematically distinguishes critical minerals management from other hardrock mining, which policymakers can amend or augment as national needs evolve.”  This would, they argue, appeal to labor and industry stakeholders because it would allow for targeted support within the advanced technology sector rather than watered-down broad-based actions across the entire hardrock mining sector.

Ultimately, they say,

“a separate statutory classification and regulatory framework for critical minerals could confer numerous benefits, enabling more efficient proactive review of new mining areas without altering existing strong environmental standards, facilitating direct allocation of funding and staff toward critical mineral project permitting efforts, and allowing policymakers to design policies and regulatory changes that appropriately affect critical and non-critical mineral projects differently.”

They conclude:

“As the mineral commodity industry has evolved over the last 150 years, U.S. policy has adapted to produce our now-familiar separate locatable, leasable, and saleable frameworks. As the country’s economic, political, security, and environmental priorities have shifted over this period, so too have the ways in which the federal government oversees domestic natural resource development.  

This history of the evolution of the existing classifications provides both a template and precedent for modifying these definitions further, as the nation’s needs continue to change. As the United States prioritizes future competitiveness in numerous energy, computing, and other advanced technologies and seeks to revitalize long-neglected domestic supply chains, a new chapter in mineral resource classification seems both timely and appropriate.” 

Food for thought for policy stakeholders looking to strengthen U.S. supply chains as critical mineral demand scenarios continue to soar against the background of heightened geopolitical tensions, and the presidential race in the United States begins to heat up.

The post Food for Thought: More Effective Critical Mineral Resource Policy via a Separate Regulatory Framework? appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

This week, a China Daily editorial zeroes in on provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress on December 22, which prevents the Pentagon from procuring batteries from Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd, BYD Co., and four other Chinese companies.

The China Daily was quick to dismiss the impact of the restrictive measure to “likely be limited given that it is still several years before the ban takes effect” and does not extend to commercial purchases, allowing, for instance, Ford Motor Co. to continue licensing technology from CATL for its electric vehicle batteries,” however, as Anna Ashraf points out in a piece for Benzinga Financial News and Data, “industries and lawmakers often use such rules as guidelines to determine trustworthy materials, products, and companies for their business operations.”

The China Daily piece goes on to accuse U.S. policy makers aiming to curb Chinese influence over U.S. supply chains of “hysteria” arguing that “rather than seeking win-win cooperation with China in the sector that will determine the future of the energy transition, some US politicians have sought to politicize the issue, by unveiling rules aimed at keeping Chinese components out of EVs sold in the US.”

Editors argue that recent high level government working group meetings indicate that “the trend of easing tensions between the two countries still continues, and will not be easily reversed by disruptive moves such as that to curb China’s EV industry boom,” however, over the course of the last few days, the rhetoric of China’s government officials in Beijing and emissaries abroad has a taken a sharper edge, as evidenced most recently by remarks by China’s ambassador to the Netherlands in response to U.S. chip-equipment curbs, telling journalists in an interview that “if the Americans treat us in a hegemonic manner, we will of course respond.”

These remarks follow on the heels of Chinese Ministry of Commerce publicly alleging that the U.S. is weaponizing export controls and using them as a tool earlier this month in reference to questions about Dutch chipmaker ASML, which, per Dutch government directive, has stopped its exports of certain chip components to China, supposedly due to U.S. pressure.

In light of the stakes and the extent of Chinese control over critical mineral supplies, U.S. policy makers’ efforts to bolster domestic supply chains hardly amount to “hysteria,” but rather a growing awareness and willingness to finally tackle an acute challenge, particularly as relations between the Washington and Beijing, in spite of high-level diplomacy and working group meetings, continue to sour.

The U.S. has taken a few steps to reduce its critical mineral supply chain vulnerabilities in recent weeks. The question is, how will China respond.

The post Tit for Tat – Escalation in Tech Wars Continues as China Alleges “Hysteria” and “Hegemonic Manner” on the Part of U.S. appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

As ARPN noted in 2023, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is preparing to invest billions of dollars into the mining sector to harness the potential of more than $1.3 trillion worth of metals and minerals the Saudi government claims are buried in the kingdom in the context of his Grand Vision 2030 plan to transform the Saudi economy.  If successful, he would make mining the so-called “third pillar” of the economy next to oil and gas.

More specifically, the kingdom is looking to secure access to materials ranging from the battery criticals to other 21^stcentury tech metals which are to be processed by new refineries and smelters to feed a “wider industrial network” across the country.

But what does Saudi Arabia’s “plunge into the world of mining” mean for the rest of the world, and especially the United States and its allies?

Thomas Biesheuvel, writing for Bloomberg’s Energy Daily, believes that the emergence of Saudi Arabia will make it “even harder for the U.S., Europe and Japan to secure the battery minerals they want.”

Says Biesheuvel:

“Saudia Arabia crashed into the world mining scene in the middle of last year with a $2.6 billion deal to buy 10% of Vale SA’s base metal unit, beating off competition from Qatar and Japan in the process.

It’s looking to buy more stakes in foreign mining operations through Manara Minerals Investment Co., a vehicle established by the kingdom’s powerful sovereign wealth fund and Saudi Arabian Mining Co. In doing so, it wants to secure metal offtake in return.”

Biesheuvel argues the model is similar to one long deployed by Japan’s commodity trading houses, but Saudi Arabia’s Mantra is state backed, and can “deploy capital with long-term strategic goals in mind.”

He concludes:

“That poses a challenge for countries such as the US, which is rushing to catch up. There have been suggestions the nation could piggyback off Saudi ambitions to secure its own supplies — essentially subcontracting out the heavy lifting.  But Saudi Arabia’s focus is to develop its own industry, and it’s becoming clearer that it will work with any country that helps achieve those goals.”

Reports in the fall of 2023 indicated that auctions for exploration licenses in the kingdom had only attracted smaller players thus far, but ARPN posited at the time that the crown prince’s willingness to take commercial risks might draw in the big players before long.  The buzz around this month’s Future Minerals Forum clearly points in this direction.

Saudi Arabia has clearly taken note that we are leaving the Petro Age, and is taking steps to position itself in a post-Petro Tech Metals Age.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has taken several positive steps to strengthen domestic supply chains, but, with the U.S.-Chinese trade war showing signs of intensifying and other players — like Saudi Arabia — making an emphatic entrance onto the world stage of the resource wars, it is time to cast aside simplistic “not in my backyard,” or “keep it all in the ground” mantras that still appear to hamper U.S. resolve, and to push forward with a comprehensive all-of-the-above critical mineral resource strategy.

The post Saudi Arabia Makes Emphatic Entrance onto Critical Minerals Stage — With Implications for U.S. and Allies appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

ARPN has been keeping a keen eye on U.S.-China relations, but if you needed a visual reminder on why it matters beyond economic and military might, Visual Capitalist is here to help and has released another great chart depicting China’s dominance of critical mineral supply chains.

Using USGS data, the expert chart makers have visualized China’s share of U.S. imports for ten critical minerals:

Sometimes a picture says more than a thousand words, but if you need more context, Visual Capitalist also provides some additional context here, and points to USGS estimates that if China were to cut off 40-50% of rare earth oxide production, it could disrupt global supply to the point where it would impact U.S. defense systems advanced component suppliers.

Followers of ARPN are aware of the increasing weaponization of trade in the context of U.S.-Chinese relations, and in particular the role of export controls, such as the ones imposed by China on germanium and gallium, as well as graphite and rare earths.

As such, it comes as no surprise that U.S. policy stakeholders are taking a firmer stance on policies relating to China, particularly in an election year. See our post on the U.S. House vote to overturn the waiver of “Buy America” requirements for taxpayer-funded EV charging stations here. 

However, these waiver requirements are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.  Mandates to source domestically or from allies can only work if there is a framework conducive to harnessing these resources, so this election cycle and beyond candidates and other stakeholders should prioritize strengthening domestic critical mineral supply chains where possible, and friend shoring, where necessary.

As geopolitical flashpoints continue to increase, so do the stakes.

The post A Visual Reminder Why China Matters in the Context of U.S. Critical Mineral Resource Policy appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Having released its first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS), Defense Department representatives are adamant that in light of the urgency of the situation, things are different.

The NDIS, they said at the official on-the-record press briefing, “is more than just an aspirational document. It outlines a strategic vision for what we need to meet our war fighters’ needs,” and will be followed up with a “detailed classified implementation plan with near-term, measurable actions and metrics to gauge progress.”

Four long-term strategic priorities serve as “guiding beacons for industrial action and resource prioritization in support of development of this modernized defense industrial ecosystem.” According to DoD’s fact sheet on the NDIS

To strengthen supply chains, the strategy, as summarized by John A. Tirpak for Air and Space Forces Magazine, calls for:

All of these measures represent corrective actions without which the U.S. and its allies might not be able to “adapt to new and emerging threat environments” at a time when the defense industrial base risks facing program-delaying material shortfalls.

At a time when geopolitical tensions continue to soar and rhetoric in the Tech War between China and the United States continues to sharpen, the prospect of a strategy backed up by specific action is a promising development, but of course, the proof is in the pudding.

ARPN will keep tabs on the implementation of the NDIS in the coming months, with a special emphasis of the announced increased leveraging of so far “underutilized” authority under the Defense Production Act, which Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy Dr. Laura D. Taylor-Kale says would give industry “more consistent demand signals” to “confidently anticipate and prepare for Pentagon needs.”

The full press briefing transcript for the NDIS release can be accessed here, while the full text of the strategy and NDIS Fact Sheet sheet can be downloaded here.

The post Pentagon: First Ever National Defense Strategy More than an “Aspirational” Document – Setting Stage for Concrete Steps appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Laura D. Taylor-Kale told the media during the official press briefing on Nov. 11, 2024:

“this is the first time that we’ve really put pen to paper to map out a strategy and a vision to create a modernized, resilient, innovative defense industrial ecosystem.”

Citing specific threats to U.S. national security – adversaries building up their military power to “levels not seen since World War II”, China’s increasingly aggressive use of “gray zone tactics across all elements of national power,” Russian aggression and Israel’s “existential fight against Hamas” – Dr. Taylor-Kale says the NDIS “seeks to answer the question, ‘How do we prioritize and optimize defense needs in a competitive environment undergirded by geopolitical, economic and technological challenges?’”

According to Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Halimah Najieb-Locke, “the NDIS is grounded in the National Defense Strategy, with a special emphasis on integrated deterrence and building that resilient ecosystem” and reflects “the Biden-Harris administration’s focus on securing and reinvigorating our defense supply chains by incorporating the presidential direction and guidance from Executive Order 14017 on America’s Supply Chains.”

The Strategy outlines four priorities which ARPN will detail further in a separate post:

1. Resilient supply chains 
2. Workforce readiness 
3. Flexible acquisition 
4. Economic deterrence 

Of particular interest to followers of ARPN is Dr. Taylor-Kale’s highlighting of the importance to streamline and make more efficient use of investment tools available to the U.S. government under the Defense Production Act and the Industrial Base Analysis Sustainment Program to strengthen U.S. domestic critical mineral supply chains, tools which Dr. Taylor-Kale admits have been “underutilized” to date.

Says Dr. Taylor-Kale:

“(…) as we have our visibility and mapping efforts ongoing, we’re able to work with the services and marshal the entire defense budget where possible, where we have programs of record to say, how are we overcoming this? How are we using acquisition strategies that actually targetareas of concern that industry has? And how are we things such as multiyear procurements, advance procurements, purchase commitments?

There are a number of tools and flexible acquisition strategies that we can employ to really drive investment into this area in a way that before now has been disparate, and so you can’t feel the impact. So we’re answering the industry’s call for consistent demand signal by organizing ourselves and targeting our efforts.

She adds:

“As much as we have used and really expanded investments using the Defense Production Act over the last few years, we’ve really only used a quarter of the authorities, really looking at the authorities.

So our goal with the implementation plan, particularly the public-facing one, will really outline some of the key areas that are important and that we, within A&S, within Industrial Base Policy, have control over, looking at, for instance, critical minerals and strategic materials, where we’ve already done a number of key investments. Since the beginning of the administration, we’ve done almost $1 billion just in critical minerals and strategic materials.

And we will obviously, just as the DASD noted, will continue working in these areas because of its importance for supply chain resilience and some of the chokepoints (…).”

A detailed implementation plan will be developed in the coming weeks, with hopes of publishing an unclassified version in February and a more detailed classified version sometime in March.

The full press briefing transcript can be accessed here, while the full text of the strategy and NDIS Fact Sheet sheet can be downloaded here.

The post Hot-Off-The-Press Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) Brings Defense Production Act Back into Focus for Critical Mineral Supply Chain Security appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Somewhat lost in the shuffle of work parties, family gatherings and holiday shopping was the Chinese government’s announcement on December 21 that it would ban the export of technology to make rare earth magnets, adding to a ban already in place on extraction and separation technologies for REEs.

In what Reuters calls an “escalating battle with the West over control of critical minerals,” Beijing significantly tightened rules guiding exports of several metals in 2023. (see ARPN’s reprise post of 2023’s main events in the critical minerals realm for more on China’s tightening of the export control ratchet).

Don Swartz, CEO of American Rare Earths, a company currently developing a REE mine and processing facility in Wyoming, sees China’s move, which follows a November 2023 directive from the Chinese government to REE exporters to report transaction details, as a clear sign that “China is driven to maintain its market dominance,” with Swartz adding that “[t]his is now a race.”

Meanwhile, for all the tit for tat in the grander scheme of the Tech Wars and a flurry of activity on the resource policy front, the West has struggled to effectively decouple its critical mineral supply chains from China.

In the case of rare earths, China, which still accounts for nearly 90% of global refined output, controls the refinement process, and area that has Western REE companies struggling because of “technical complexities and pollution concerns” in the solvent extraction process, as Reuters points out.

Nonetheless, experts believe the latest announcement should be “a clarion call that dependence on China in any part of the value chain is not sustainable.” 

The West may have kicked off the new year already, but Chinese New Year is still upon us. 2023, the Lunar Year of the Rabbit, was supposed to bring us “relaxation, fluidity, quietness and contemplation.”  What we got, was an escalation of the Tech Wars, more resource nationalism and more geopolitical instability.  At the same time, these developments also served as catalysts kicking efforts to strengthen domestic supply chains into high gear.

With 2024 moving us into the Lunar Year of the Dragon, the overall energy of which is said to be “vital and competitive,” we may be in for a tumultuous ride.

Read ARPN’s Year in Review – A Look at 2023 Through the Prism of Critical Mineral Resource Policy here. 

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