Last year, we noted that our coverage of the report coincided with Groundhog Day, February 2^nd.  And just like in the Bill Murray classic movie, in which the clock jumps back to the same day all over again every morning, the Critical Mineral movie appeared to bring us back to a situation of ongoing deep dependency on foreign sourced metals and minerals every year – at least in recent memory.

This year, we’re once again back with a look at the report, and, lo and behold, it’s Groundhog Day all over again – and by the looks of it not only with regards to the date, but also in terms of what we’re seeing, especially on one of the most telling charts of the report – the depiction of U.S. Net Import Reliance, or “Blue Wall of Dependency” as we have dubbed it based on the many blue bars showing our significant degree of import dependence.

While there are some changes from last year’s report, the number of metals and minerals for which we are 100% import dependent stayed the same at 15.  The the number of metals and minerals for which we are 50% or more import-dependent has dropped slightly, after having gone up over the year before — with the new report pegging it at 49 versus 51 in 2023 and 47 in 2022.

When cross-referencing the U.S. Net Import Reliance chart with the 2022 Final list of Critical Minerals, the United States was 100% net import reliant for 12, and an additional 29 critical mineral commodities (including 14 Rare Earth lanthanides, which are listed under rare earths) had a net import reliance greater than 50% of apparent consumption — a small drop by two over last year’s report.

Once more, ARPN  can’t help but observe that the trendlines represent a stark contrast to U.S. import reliance for metals and minerals in 1984, when we were 100% import reliant for just 11 mineral commodities.

A few changes for individual metals and minerals included in the report are notable and significant, particularly in the context of the accelerating global green energy transition:

For the Rare Earths, a key group of tech metals underpinning 21st Century technology and the accelerating green energy transition, our import reliance had dropped from 100% in the 2021 report to “greater than 90%” in the 2022 report.  Last year’s report had, this number back up to “greater than 95%” and it remains at the same level in this year’s report, with rare earth concentrate being extracted in the U.S. currently sent to China for separation.  Once again, a single link lacking in a supply chain continues U.S. dependency.

For Lithium, perhaps the most frequently cited battery tech mineral, and Cobalt, another one of Lithium’s “battery critical” peers, U.S. import reliance stayed the same at “greater than 25%” for lithium, while Cobalt’s number dropped from 76% to 69%.

For Graphite and Manganese, both battery criticals – the USGS report shows both still pegged at an unchanged 100% import reliance, unchanged from last year.

For Nickel, the final battery critical and a new element on the 2022 Critical Mineral List, import-reliance saw a small jump from 56% last year to 57% in this year’s report, after a more significant jump the year before (from 48% to 56%).

Import reliance for Platinum represents one of the biggest changes over last year’s report, which had the metal pegged at 66%. That number increased to 84 percent in the 2024 report.

Another change worth mentioning is the upward trajectory for Copper import reliance. In the 2010s, import reliance for Copper hovered around 30 to 35 percent, but in recent years, that number has gone up.  This year’s report has it pegged at 46%, up from 41% in the 2023 report.  This development that may be of particular relevance as in 2024, the U.S. Government Critical Minerals List is up for another update, on the 3-year timetable codified in federal law, and in spite of the metal’s inarguable growing importance in the context of decarbonization efforts and expert warnings that there may not be enough copper to meet decarbonization goals in the next few decades, the material has to date been left off the whole-of-government list. Congressional efforts to change this may have not succeeded in 2023, but the Department of Energy designated the material a critical material as part of its 2023 Critical Materials Assessment, further raising the material’s clout.

As in previous iterations of the report, China continues to be the elephant in the data room. And against all pledges in recent years for the United States to reduce import reliance on supplies from China, the 2023 Mineral Commodity Summaries lists China 24 times as one of the major import sources of metals and minerals for which our net import reliance is 50% or greater (which is down by one over last year) – and for all the talk about decoupling supply chains from China and against the backdrop of the escalating trade and tech wars between Beijing and Washington (see our coverage here), this continues to be a concern.

Like last year’s report, this year’s Mineral Commodity Summaries report features an expanded chapter on developments in the critical minerals realm, identifying trend lines, and supply chain security and U.S. government critical minerals initiatives as well as critical mineral investments.

Last year we noted that “while the urgency of the need to secure critical mineral supply chains has registered with stakeholders over the past few years, USGS’s findings underscore once more that supply chains in the 21st Century are extremely complex and meaningful change takes time – and the developments of 2022 ranging from increased resource nationalism in the Southern hemisphere over war in Ukraine to rising geopolitical tensions have not made untangling supply chains any easier.”

Since then, the stakes have only gotten higher as geopolitical tensions continue to rise and U.S.-Chinese relations appear to sour, but ARPN’s basic assessment of the situation stays the same.

So, with the report revealing more of the same, and in true Groundhog Day fashion, we revisit last year’s post, in which we stated:

“In Bill Murray’s movie, it took the protagonist several years to realize how to change behavior to break the cycle.  We know by now that to break our cycle of resource dependence, it will take a comprehensive ‘all of the above’ approach to critical mineral resource policy – and stakeholders have come to realize this and have increasingly embraced the concept.  We continue to stand by what ARPN’s Dan McGroarty stated during a congressional hearing in 2019 – ‘we can’t admire the problem anymore. We don’t have the luxury of time.’

If we act swiftly and comprehensively, there may just be a chance that we will wake up twelve months from now not to another Groundhog Day, but to a 2024 Mineral Commodity Summaries that paints a picture of reduced resource dependence.”

2024’s report was not the one to paint that picture, but in light of recent policy developments (see our recap of 2023 here and refer to page 18 – 22 of the report), there is still hope we will be getting closer by the time next year’s Groundhog Day rolls around.  Meanwhile, with apologies to Punxsutawney Phil’s cheery forecast of an early spring, ARPN is projecting another long winter ahead of Critical Mineral foreign dependency.

The post Groundhog Day All Over Again in Spite of Rising Pressures? USGS Releases Annual Mineral Commodity Summaries Report appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Against ever-surging demand scenarios, important progress to strengthen U.S. critical mineral supply chains has been made over the course of the past few years.

However, Peter Cook and Seaver Wang, analysts with the Breakthrough Institute, argue in a new piece that more could be accomplished through separate regulatory framework for this new class of minerals, which would allow for the coherent organization of “individual policies over the long term at scales commensurate with national progress toward a new technological age.”

They argue that because “existing processes do not manage critical minerals apart from other types of mining”policymakers are currently left with “piecemeal actions, like project grants and mapping campaigns.”Meanwhile, “continuing to treat all hardrock mining as a single inseparable bucket may encourage ineffective and unnecessarily broad, industrywide reforms.”

In their piece, Cook and Wang recommend the creation of a regulatory “infrastructure that systematically distinguishes critical minerals management from other hardrock mining, which policymakers can amend or augment as national needs evolve.”  This would, they argue, appeal to labor and industry stakeholders because it would allow for targeted support within the advanced technology sector rather than watered-down broad-based actions across the entire hardrock mining sector.

Ultimately, they say,

“a separate statutory classification and regulatory framework for critical minerals could confer numerous benefits, enabling more efficient proactive review of new mining areas without altering existing strong environmental standards, facilitating direct allocation of funding and staff toward critical mineral project permitting efforts, and allowing policymakers to design policies and regulatory changes that appropriately affect critical and non-critical mineral projects differently.”

They conclude:

“As the mineral commodity industry has evolved over the last 150 years, U.S. policy has adapted to produce our now-familiar separate locatable, leasable, and saleable frameworks. As the country’s economic, political, security, and environmental priorities have shifted over this period, so too have the ways in which the federal government oversees domestic natural resource development.  

This history of the evolution of the existing classifications provides both a template and precedent for modifying these definitions further, as the nation’s needs continue to change. As the United States prioritizes future competitiveness in numerous energy, computing, and other advanced technologies and seeks to revitalize long-neglected domestic supply chains, a new chapter in mineral resource classification seems both timely and appropriate.” 

Food for thought for policy stakeholders looking to strengthen U.S. supply chains as critical mineral demand scenarios continue to soar against the background of heightened geopolitical tensions, and the presidential race in the United States begins to heat up.

The post Food for Thought: More Effective Critical Mineral Resource Policy via a Separate Regulatory Framework? appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

The parades, barbecues, pool parties and fireworks to mark this year’s Independence Day are over.  There’s much to be thankful for, especially at a time when the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine, now in its second year, reverberates around the globe and geopolitical tensions continue to mount.

ARPN has always used the occasion of Independence Day to remind ourselves that “while we cherish the freedom we are blessed with in so many ways, we must not become complacent, as there are areas where we’re increasingly becoming less independent” — with our reliance on foreign mineral resources being a case in point.

Thankfully, stakeholders are increasingly aware of the urgency to strengthen critical mineral supply chains, and, on the heels of a global pandemic, ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, and growing resource nationalism, a flurry of activity has dominated the critical minerals space, ranging from domestic efforts over bilateral trade agreements to multilateral alliances.

For the U.S., a notable example of domestic efforts is the series of DPA Presidential Determinations involving specific Critical Minerals, beginning with President Trump’s July 2019 designation of the Rare Earth permanent magnet supply chain being designated as “essential for the national defense,” followed by President Biden’s designation of what ARPN calls the “Battery Criticals” as DPA Title III eligible in March 2022, followed by Platinum and Palladium in a DPA Presidential Determination in June 2022.  Earlier this spring, two further Presidential Determinations (February 27, 2023 Presidential Determination, and DPA Presidential Determination (2023-5)), effectively created an entirely new category of critical minerals – the “defense criticals” and designated airbreathing engines, advanced avionics navigation and guidance systems, and hypersonic systems and their “constituent materials” as priority DPA materials.

(for more on the Defense Criticals, read our post here.)

Followers of ARPN are further aware of policy initiatives like the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) or the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which are currently being followed by bilateral trade agreements, as well as U.S.-EU discussions to launch a “critical mineral club.”

While the United States and our partners have taken several important steps to decouple critical mineral supply chains from China, Beijing, having systematically built out its dominance across the entire value chain from mining over processing to manufacturing, still has a chokehold on many key critical minerals, and particularly the EV battery supply chain.

And for all of the recent U.S. policy efforts, the latest USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries report confirmed that our critical mineral dependencies still persist.

There is momentum to change this, however, as we have previously argued:

“Those familiar with the inner-workings of Washington, D.C. know all too well that particularly in an election year policy efforts can quickly lose steam or fizzle over attempts to placate certain constituencies. Against all affirmations to strengthen domestic supply chains, the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) sentiment is still strong.”

As followers of ARPN well know, the stakes are too high to let the momentum for comprehensive reform fizzle.

With a new “Great Game” afoot in the global mineral resource realm (see our most recent post on the issue here), the U.S. must double down on its push to secure critical mineral supply chains from “soup to nuts” to borrow a term used by U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm.

With the West’s resource dependence running deep, and Beijing’s determination to continue its global quest for resource dominance unbroken, the critical mineral arms race will continue to heat up.   Stakeholders here and elsewhere must gear up for the long haul.

As ARPN stated in a previous post, Rome wasn’t built in a day.

Neither was the United States of America.

But built it was, challenges were overcome — and we are celebrating the men and women who have fought for and continue to safeguard our freedoms this week.

Here’s hoping that one day we will be able to say the same for the critical mineral supply chains that anchor the technology economies of the 21st Century.

The post Independence Day 2023 — As We Celebrate Our Freedoms, (Resource) Dependency Still Looms Large appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

The newly proposed rules requiring automakers to reduce carbon emissions by 56% in their 2032 models compared to 2026 models will only add fuel to the fire at a time when geopolitical and trade tensions between the United States and our allies on one hand, and China on the other are soaring.

Recent policy developments, such as the Biden Administration’s invoking of the Defense Production Act (DPA) for the five “battery criticals” — graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese –  as well as the rare earths, declared DPA priority materials during the Trump Administration, plus the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the energy provisions of which contained EV tax credits observers said would send important signals to investors and industry that the U.S. was serious about domestic supply chains, have provided hope for a positive change, but, as ARPN pointed out recently, “after decades of dwindling domestic resource production and rising import reliance, no one ever said turning an aircraft carrier this size would be easy.”  

Lithium has, to an extent, become the poster child of the push to strengthen EV battery supply chains – after all, it’s mostly “Lithium-ion” batteries we’re talking about. Concerns are certainly well-founded with material shortages for lithium predicted to hit in just a few short years, but a recent Autoweek story and interview with Graphex Technologies CEO John DeMaio outlines “another serious material issue on the horizon: graphite sourcing.”  

As ARPN has previously argued, while much of the focus has been on the cathode of the EV battery, the anode warrants a close look, and may in fact be our “Achilles heel when it comes to building out a battery supply chain independent of China.”

DeMaio explains:

“As far as the percentage of the components in a battery cell, almost the entire anode is graphite. So that makes graphite about 45% of the individual cell.

On a total component basis for an EV battery, graphite is about 25% to 28% of the whole thing. It’s by far the largest component by volume and mass in the battery. And people don’t realize that a lithium-ion battery is sometimes up to 15 times more graphite than lithium. It’s really the unsung player.”

While to date, the supply chain for this “unsung player” is quite firmly dominated by China, the sourcing provisions in the energy passages of the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), coupled with the recently announced grants to “supercharge” U.S. EV battery and electric grid supply chains are important steps towards mitigating that potential single point of failure.

Projects currently underway are expected to qualify for the IRA credits, and ultimately help “domesticate” the graphite supply chain, including Graphex’s pitch coating facility coming online in Michigan, and Graphite One, Inc.’s cooperation with two U.S. national laboratories under the Department of Energy umbrella in an effort to establish an all-American mine-to-manufacturing supply chain. Graphite One, Inc.’s Graphite Creek deposit near Nome, Alaska was recently recognized by the U.S. Geological Survey as the largest U.S. graphite deposit and among the largest in the world.

As DeMaio points out, it’s a “herculean task at hand” because “the United States (…) is so intertwined with China that it’s a little impractical to think we’re going to extract ourselves overnight.”

The challenge becomes even bigger if one considers that, as scholars at the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Center have argued “the Biden administration’s efforts to free up federal funds for domestic mining activities has highlighted the inherent conflict between accessing the minerals needed for climate action and the administration’s commitment to environmental and social justice.” 

However herculean the task may be, it is one we cannot shy away from because as ARPN has previously pointed out, lofty goals of net carbon neutrality – and that includes the just-released proposed EPA emission standards –  will not be achievable if we don’t embrace a push to secure critical mineral supply chains from “soup to nuts” to borrow a term used by Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm.

All of which brings us back to what we have noted often at ARPN — the first word in supply chain is… supply.

The post Securing the Supply Chain for Graphite — the “Unsung Player” in Battery Supply Chain –“Herculean Task,” But One That Must Be Prioritized In Push Toward Net Zero Carbon appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

While the number of metals and minerals for which the U.S. remains 100% import dependent may have dropped by two from 17 to 15, the number of materials for which we are more than 50% or more import dependent has actually gone up over last year.

When cross-referencing the U.S. Net Import Reliance chart with the 2022 Final list of Critical Minerals, the United States was 100% net import reliant for 12, and an additional 31 critical mineral commodities (including 14 lanthanides, which are listed under rare earths) had a net import reliance greater than 50% of apparent consumption.

Recent policy developments, such as the Biden Administration’s invoking of the Defense Production Act (DPA) for the five “battery criticals” — graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese –  as well as the rare earths, declared DPA priority materials during the Trump Adminstration, plus the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, the energy provisions of which contained EV tax credits observers said would send important signals to investors and industry that the U.S. was serious about domestic supply chains, provide hope for a positive change.

But, after decades of dwindling domestic resource production and rising import reliance, no one ever said turning an aircraft carrier this size would be easy.  As Morgan D. Bazilian of the Colorado School of Mines and Gregory Brew from the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University argue in a recent piece for Foreign Affairs, while this general trend represents “welcome and overdue progress, (…) implementing plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could be stymied in part by a material obstacle: the procurement of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper that are essential to clean energy systems,” which in their words have so far been “myopic.”

At the same time, as scholars at the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Center have pointed out, “the Biden administration’s efforts to free up federal funds for domestic mining activities has highlighted the inherent conflict between accessing the minerals needed for climate action and the administration’s commitment to environmental and social justice.” 

Developments like the recent Biden administration halt on progress on the Ambler Road project in Alaska, which proponents say would unlock access to critical minerals and create new jobs, or the cancellation of the two mineral leases held by Twin Metals Minnesota LLC which seeks to mine copper, nickel and other commodities near the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, point to conflicting viewpoints between the President’s stated objectives and his Administration’s policy.

This week’s State of the Union Address to both chambers of Congress could have provided important impetus to strengthen critical mineral supply chains. However, while professing that his administration understood the importance of making sure that “the supply chain for America begins in America,” the President’s speech never once referenced the terms “critical minerals,” “mining,” or “processing.”  

That is in spite of the fact that there are promising developments underway – especially for the “battery criticals.”  Over the next few weeks ARPN will be looking at each of these materials, now deemed under President Biden’s DPA determination to be “essential to the national defense,” and the U.S.-based projects working to urgently needed new supply into production.

Let’s start with graphite, one of the materials for which USGS noted an ongoing 100% import dependence this year.

As the key raw material in the battery anode, graphite is the largest component of lithium-ion batteries by weight. In light of “phenomenal demand growth from the EV battery sector and delays to new capacity as well as rising power costs,” the graphite supply chain represents a significant and growing challenge for automakers looking to reduce the carbon footprint of the materials they use for their EVs.

However, that’s not for lack of known graphite resources.  As USGS noted in February 2022 in its updated U.S. Mineral Deposit Database, the Graphite Creek deposit near Nome, Alaska – being developed by Graphite One, Inc. — is America’s largest graphite deposit.

Graphite One recently announced it is cooperating with two U.S. national laboratories under the Department of Energy umbrella in an effort to establish a mine-to-manufacturing all-American graphite supply chain.

In January, the company announced that it had entered into an agreement to have active anode material and other materials sourced from Graphite Creek tested to verify conformity to EV battery specifications by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).

Aside from these public private partnerships according to Metal Tech News’s Shane Lasley, at least three automakers to date have also taken notice and are currently testing Graphite One material for use in their EV batteries.

In keeping with the new generation of miners looking to harness the materials science revolution to responsibly green our energy future [see ARPN’s post series on mining companies’ sustainability initiatives here], the company is also collaborating with Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico to explore the lab’s award-winning green extraction methods to recover materials other than graphite from Graphite Creek – providing, in Lasley’s words, an opportunity to “provide an ancillary income stream for Graphite One while maximizing the Alaska deposit’s potential to supply minerals critical to the U.S” or – to use the President’s State of the Union verbiage — an opportunity to make sure that “the supply chain for America begins in America.”

As ARPN recently pointed out,

“If U.S. Government efforts to develop an American-based EV and lithium-ion battery supply chain have any hope of succeeding, looking for ways to help projects like Graphite Creek down the path to production will be, in a word…. Critical.”

The post As Critical Mineral Dependencies Persist, Promising “Battery Criticals” Projects Provide Opportunity to Ensure that “the Supply Chain for America Begins in America” – A Look at Graphite appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

With Congressional leadership elections – finally – behind us, policy makers in Washington are gearing up to delve into the issues, and, if the newly announced House Committee assignments are any indication, critical mineral resource and supply chain security will rate high on the priority list.

Looking at the overall trend lines in the critical minerals space, earlier this month we outlined the themes we see emerging for this year, as follows:

• A focus on the Super Criticals (see our Year in Review post for more info);
• the growing importance of geopolitics, with China taking center stage and alliances and partnerships continuing to be forged to reduce reliance on Beijing;
• the acceleration of the green energy transition which will require vast amounts of critical minerals;
• …as well as industry’s efforts to sustainably green our future by harnessing the materials science revolution.

It appears the urgency to act is not lost on policy makers, and earlier this week, Rep. Peter Stauber (R-Minnesota) the incoming chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, offered an early glimpse into plans to overhaul the permitting process for energy projects with the new House majority.

Rep. Stauber has introduced the “Permitting for Mining Needs Act,” a bill that seeks to spur domestic critical mineral production to meet national defense, technology and clean energy needs.

Incoming House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Bruce Westerman (R-Arkansas) has vowed to make permitting reform a priority in the 118th Congress, stressing in an interview earlier this week that “[t]he country’s got to come to grips with where we want to go with this electric economy”  and if we do, being “totally dependent on China and other countries like that to supply the materials we need” is not the answer, but rather striving to “produce these elements and minerals on our own.”  

Prioritizing the decoupling from Beijing is also the emerging theme from a vote to establish a Select U.S. House Committee on China, which will consist of nine Republicans and seven Democrats, and will be headed up by Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin), who has framed U.S.-Chinese competition as a 21st Century Cold War and wrote in an op-ed for Fox News that the “first step is to restore our supply chains and end critical economic dependencies on China,” which he noted produced approximately 90% of the world’s rare earth metals, alloys, and permanent magnets in 2019.

Of course, if recent years on Capitol Hill serve as a guide, we can’t expect a high level of bipartisanship of the 118^th Congress overall, but the critical minerals space may continue to be a rare exception.

As a new piece for National Law Review outlines, “there is growing consensus that the U.S. must avoid trading dependencies on foreign sources of fossil fuels, for one, on Chinese critical minerals,” and while reform efforts may face an uphill battle with fundamental disagreements persisting over constraints on environmental reviews and timelines, “[p]ermitting reform will continue to be an issue receiving bipartisan attention,” though “[f]undamental disagreements among Democrats persist on how to put new constraints on environmental reviews and timelines.”

An area “ripe for bipartisanship” according to National Law Review could be “[t]echnologies to trap carbon emissions from power plants and suck carbon directly out of the atmosphere,” with some lawmakers “convinced there will be an appetite to boost carbon removal startups in the next few years.”

Meanwhile, external pressures continue to grow, with geopolitical tensions rising and the green energy transition accelerating.

Here’s hoping Santa put some sneakers under the tree this Christmas, because if this week’s policy announcements in Washington, D.C. are any indication, this first month of 2023, we’ve hit the ground running.

The post New Year, New Congress, New Impetus for Critical Mineral Policy Reform? appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

For most of us, the first week of January means it’s time to go back to the grind after an extended period of family time, food coma, rest and – hypothetically, at least — reflection.  It also means trying shake the brain fog and mental rust that has settled in order to dive back into the swing of things.

Today, it’s time to meet 2023 head-on.

If you could use a refresher to get you up to speed on where we are in the critical minerals space, take a look at our “Year in Review” post, especially if you missed it amidst the pre-holiday craziness in December.

In it, we argued that in some ways, 2022 was the year in which strengthening supply chains moved from “rhetoric to reality” as much progress was made, including important groundwork to build out a secure North American critical minerals supply chain.  However, we also cautioned that much more remains to be done, and to overcome the many challenges, new alliances will need to be forged.

As Shane Lasley argues in Critical Minerals Alliances 2022, a magazine covering 29 metals and minerals (when counting rare earths as 14)  deemed critical to North American supply chains as well as related policy issues:

 “The optimum solution to laying the foundation for the next epoch of human progress will only be discovered through the forging of unlikely alliances between the woke and old school, environmental conservationists and natural resource developers, liberals and conservatives, national laboratories and private sector entrepreneurs, local stakeholders and global mining companies, venture capitalists and innovators, and everyone else with visions of a cleaner, greener, and high-tech future.”

Now the question is, what lies ahead?

As we look at overall trend lines in the critical minerals space, we see the following themes emerge:

• A focus on the Super Criticals (see our Year in Review post for more info);
• the growing importance of geopolitics, with China taking center stage and alliances and partnerships continuing to be forged to reduce reliance on Beijing;
• the acceleration of the green energy transition which will require vast amounts of critical minerals;
• as well as industry’s efforts to sustainably green our future by harnessing the materials science revolution.

All of these themes are intertwined, and more may emerge in the coming months, but rest assured that ARPN will be covering these issues extensively as we go forward.

Of course, we are not the only ones to have paused and reflected on what’s to come in 2023.  In a new piece for InvestorIntel.com, editor in chief, critical minerals, Jack Lifton stipulates that “2023 is a breaking point if there is to be an EV revolution/transformation.”

Arguing that “[i]t is not at all certain that high-tech, critical minerals producers and processors, will be ready or even existent by the time the minerals can be delivered to their end-user manufacturers,” Lifton says that “[i]t’s time that car makers performed a due diligence on the critical minerals’ supply space.”

In his view, car makers must — specifically for minerals, metals and manufactured components dependent upon lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, manganese and the rare earths —

• “[a]scertain whether or not the supply of finished components necessary for the assembly of motor vehicles (…) can meet current and all future demand;
• and predict and mandate price maximums for critical minerals that they can afford if their products are to be sellable.”

Benchmark Mineral Intelligence’s Simon Moores says that “2023 will be the end of the start up phase for electric vehicles and battery supply chains” as we are “entering scale up.” He adds: “This may seem like demand (which industry could not fulfill) is falling when it’s high and volatile. A sky high but bumpy ride ahead.”

In the waning days of December the stage was set for 2023 with decisions to come standing to determine national fortunes and human progress in decades ahead.

As 2023 rolls down the runway, it’s time to buckle up.

The post 2023 – Trend Lines and Breaking Points – It’s Time to Buckle Up (Especially in the EV Space) appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

While not explicitly naming China, observers see the 58-page strategy document as a “clear attempt to eat into Beijing’s market share” following on the heels of similar strategies launched by the United States and the European Union (…) that explicitly name ‘breaking dependence’ on China as a goal.

Wilkinson told reporters at the launch event that

“[p]art of the critical minerals strategy from an international perspective is about geopolitics. (…) It’s about ensuring that not just Canada but democratic countries around the world have access to the resources they require in a manner that does not make them vulnerable in the same way we saw Germany, for example, become vulnerable to pressures from Russia.”

Only a few weeks ago, Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance publicly embraced the concept of “friend-shoring,” the concept in which “democracies must make a conscious effort to build tour supply chains through each other’s economies” in remarks at a Brookings Foundation event in Washington, D.C..

In keeping with the new Critical Minerals Strategy, earlier this week, at the UN Biodiversity conference (COP15) in Montreal, Canada, Wilkinson was joined by representatives of Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States to announce the launch of the “Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance to drive the global uptake of environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive and responsible development.”

According to the launch press release, “[m]embers of the Alliance welcome and encourage collaboration with Indigenous communities, non-governmental organizations, industry and other non-state actors, as well as actions taken domestically and globally to advance the objectives of the Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance and call on others to join.”

The United States and Canada share a long special relationship which is “more than metaphorical” as ARPN’s Daniel McGroarty phrased it in a 2018 piece for Investors Business Daily. More recently, in 2020, the Canada-U.S. Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals was announced on 9 January 2020 to

“advance bilateral interest in securing supply chains for the critical minerals needed for strategic manufacturing sectors, including communication technology, aerospace and defense, and clean technology. The Action Plan is guiding cooperation between officials in areas such as industry engagement, innovation, defense supply chains, improving information sharing on mineral resources and potential, and cooperation in multilateral forums.” 

Both countries are also close partners within the context of several multilateral frameworks for allied cooperation such as the National Technology Industrial Base (NTIB), which, originally established to strengthen technology links between the U.S. and Canada in 1993, was expanded in 2016 to include the United Kingdom and Australia.

From a U.S. perspective, Canada’s new Critical Minerals Strategy and the launch of the Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance are positive developments, but as ARPN previously noted in a similar context:

“[T]empting as it may be – particularly in light of the pervasive nature of the ‘paradox of the green revolution’, as Reuters columnist Andy Home called the paradox that ‘public opinion is firmly in favour of decarbonisation but not the mines and smelters needed to get there’ – we must not be complacent and rely too much on friend-shoring.”

The balancing act to reconcile green credentials with the acknowledged need for domestic resource development will not get any easier for the Biden Administration and other policy stakeholders.  “Friend-shoring” is a crucial piece of the resource security puzzle, but — in light of mounting demand and ever higher stakes of continued resource dependency — the only viable path to success in the long run lies in a comprehensive “all-of-the-above” policy approach from mine to manufacturing which encompasses fostering cooperation with allies and scaling up research and development while at the same time building out domestic production and processing capabilities along with recycling and closed-loop technology.

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The latest case in point: Sen. Dan Sullivan’s (R-Alaska) and Mitt Romney’s (R-Utah) just-introduced “Critical Mineral Independence Act of 2022,” legislation aimed at reducing the United States’ over-reliance on China for its critical mineral needs by strengthening provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which had previously given a boost to critical mineral mining and processing.

Operating under the premise that “the U.S. cannot afford to allow the critical minerals used by the Department of Defense (DoD) to be mined or processed in adversarial countries, and it must urgently invest and build its capabilities to achieve critical mineral independence in coordination with allies,” the bill would:

• “[d]irect the expansion of critical mineral mining and processing in the U.S. and allied countries to achieve critical mineral supply chain independence for the Department of Defense by 2027;
• [r]equire the director of the Defense Logistics Agency to develop a strategy to expedite critical mineral mining and processing, and then requires the implementation of that strategy;
• [and a]uthorize the use of the underlying $1 billion in the NDAA to execute the procurement strategy.”

In a statement on the introduction of the bill, Sen. Sullivan highlighted the United States’ vast domestic mineral potential, much of which could be unleashed in the Senator’s home state of Alaska. He says:

“We cannot continue to be dependent on China for critical minerals—resources that are crucial to our economy, and which we have in abundance in the U.S., particularly in Alaska like the significant copper and zinc resources in the Ambler Mining District that the Biden administration—remarkably—continues to delay.”  

[To keep up with Alaska’s critical mineral potential and current developments, be sure to follow North of 60 Mining News’s Shane Lasley, whose work ARPN has featured on many occasions.]

Sen. Sullivan adds:

“If we are going to build out and support our domestic clean energy industries and national security initiatives, we need to get serious about a strategy for unleashing America’s national supply chains and processing capabilities. In doing so, we will create thousands of good-paying jobs, protect our national security interests, deny economic support for violators of basic human rights and build out America’s all-of-the-above energy sector.” 

With the mid-term elections now in the rear view mirror and policy makers increasingly realizing the urgency of securing critical mineral resource supply chains to bolster our nation’s national security and economic wellbeing, momentum for mineral resource policy reform is building.  ARPN will track the “Critical Mineral Independence Act of 2022” along with other legislative efforts in the coming months.

The post Policy Makers Step Up Efforts to Secure Domestic Critical Mineral Supply Chains — U.S. Senators Introduce the “Critical Mineral Independence Act of 2022” appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Basing the decision on “facts and evidence and on the advice of critical minerals subject matter experts, Canada’s security and intelligence community, and other government partners,” Canada’s Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry declared in a statement:

“While Canada continues to welcome foreign direct investment, we will act decisively when investments threaten our national security and our critical minerals supply chains, both at home and abroad. In accordance with the [Investment Canada Act], foreign investments are subject to review for national security concerns, and certain types of investment—such as those in the critical minerals sectors—receive enhanced scrutiny.

Therefore, we reviewed a number of investments in Canadian companies engaged in the critical minerals sector, including lithium. These companies were reviewed via the multi-step national security review process, which involves rigorous scrutiny by Canada’s national security and intelligence community. As a result of that process, the Government of Canada has ordered the divestiture of the following investments by foreign investors in Canadian critical mineral companies: 

• Sinomine (Hong Kong) Rare Metals Resources Co., Limited is required to divest itself of its investment in Power Metals Corp.
• Chengze Lithium International Limited is required to divest itself of its investment in Lithium Chile Inc.
• Zangge Mining Investment (Chengdu) Co., Ltd. is required to divest itself of its investment in Ultra Lithium Inc.”

As Reuters columnist Andy Home observes, the new policy on critical mineral investment is both “wide ranging and far-reaching:”

“It’s not just China’s state-owned players that will come in for extra scrutiny, but also any private investors ‘assessed as being closely tied to, subject to influence from, or who could be compelled to comply with extrajudicial direction from foreign governments.’”

What’s more, he argues, “the policy covers not just mining but all stages of the minerals processing chain.”

The ramifications of Canada’s move will stretch beyond our neighbors’ borders. For one, it hardens the already drawn “geopolitical battle-lines in the metals sector” between the West and adversary nations, i.e. China.

It also places additional pressure on all segments of the already strained  U.S. critical minerals supply chain.

The recently passed congressional Inflation Reduction Act contained sourcing requirements for EV credits.  Observers have outlined that, while sending an appropriate message, the requirements also represent an “almost insurmountable challenge” as “considering it takes seven years to build a mine and refining plant but only 24 months to build a battery plant, the best part of this decade is needed to establish an entirely new industry in the United States.”  

The global push towards net zero carbon emissions, which has received fresh impetus with the COP 27 climate summit commencing today in Sharm El Sheik, will further up the ante.

While we are still days and maybe weeks away from leaving the Congressional midterm election with all its theatrics in the rear view mirror, policymakers and other stakeholders would be well-advised to shift focus from politics to policy, and act swiftly and decisively to bolster North American supply chains.

The post Canada’s New Critical Mineral Investment Rules for State-Owned Entities Harden Already-Drawn “Geopolitical Battle-Lines in the Metals Sector” appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.