Arguing that while it is “possible to produce them here” he says that “onerous federal rules make it extremely difficult,”adding that “[w]e cannot sit idly by and hope our U.S. mining industry can cut through the red tape currently strangling it.”

Sen. Risch points to the long-standing and, against the backdrop of surging demand, increasingly dangerous practice of over-relying on foreign – and especially Chinese supplies of critical minerals, which has given our adversaries significant leverage over us. The senator points to China’s penchant for weaponizing the mineral supply chain, with recent examples being the restriction of gallium and germanium exports — key components of semiconductor production and defense technology, arguing that “[i]t is only a matter of time before China decides to punish the U.S. and ur allies again by holding minerals hostage. That will even apply to minerals that are mined in the U.S. but processed in China, like copper.”

Meanwhile, one of the key obstacles to increased domestic mining and processing according to Sen. Risch, is the Biden administration, under whose guise a “working group on mining regulations released recommendations that, if implemented would transition mineral rights to a leasing program and add a dirt tax to every shovelful of ore, regardless of the value of the mineral,” which, according to the senator “would add years to the already lengthy permitting process and stifle investment in mining projects.”

Followers of ARPN are familiar with the average permitting timeframe for mining projects of roughly seven to ten years.  Litigation from NIMBY environmental groups — Sen. Risch points to the Rosemont decision in the Ninth Circuit Court which “changed the interpretation of long-established mining law” and “hampers the industry while making mining significantly less efficient and cost-effective”– can further add years to the already onerous process.

With even U.S. car companies requesting that the Biden administration speed up the mine permitting process, a consensus is growing that reform should be a national priority.

Sen. Risch points to the U.S. Department of Defense being an outlier in the administration and having recognized the “danger we face, which is why it is awarding grants to critical mining projects.”  The senator highlights the stibnite gold project in the central region of his home state of Idaho, where Perpetua Resources is working to be the sole domestic source of antimony, a key component of military technology.

But of course, as followers of ARPN know, there are more projects receiving DoD support with even more expected to be announced on a rolling basis.

In ARPN’s latest post on the blog, we pointed a series of Presidential Determinations involving specific critical minerals which laid the foundation for this type of funding under Defense Production Act Title III authority.

Current projects, recently highlighted by Oregon Group’s Anthony Milewski, include:

• Graphite: a $37.5 million agreement between the DoD and Graphite One (Alaska) to fast-track a domestic graphite mine;
• Antimony (as highlighted by Sen. Risch): two awards — $24.8 million and $15.5 million — by the DoD to Perpetua Resources to secure a domestic source of antimony [an additional conditional award of up to $34.6 million under the existing Technology Investment Agreement was announced earlier last month];
• Lithium: a $90million agreement to secure lithium production between the DoD and Abermarle;
• Nickel: a US $20.6 million agreement between the DoD and Talon Nickel to increase domestic nickel production.

Closes Sen. Risch:

“Every aspect of our society and security relies on processed minerals and would therefore benefit from expedited permitting and easier access. We cannot afford to wait until China reduces or even cuts off our access to critical minerals.

It is time for America to see the power of the U.S. mining industry, invest in it, and secure our supply chains. The technology we depend on every day is only possible because of mining. To ensure not just our economic success but our national security, Congress must revamp our mining laws and substantially reduce irrelevant regulations.”

The stakes are getting higher by the day, and, as ARPN’s Daniel McGroarty pointed out years ago, “we can’t admire the problem any longer” because “we don’t have the luxury of time.” However, we are dealing with Washington, D.C., and the question is whether Congressional stakeholders will finally be able to put policy over politics in an election year.

The post U.S. Senator: Embrace Domestic Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals “Before It’s Too Late” appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

While some chipmakers have played down fears of shortages, former Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Wei Jianguo’s comments to the China Daily newspaper “that countries should brace for more should they continue to pressure China, describing the controls as a ‘well-thought-out heavy punch’ and ‘just a start,’” have prompted fears that more export curbs on critical materials, including on rare earths could be on the menu.

With China controlling roughly 90 percent of the global refined output of rare earths, and the specter of more Chinese export controls looming large, analysts suggest that the United States and its partners must kick their efforts to reduce their reliance on Chinese into high gear.

According to Goldman Sachs analysts, “China is the source of more than 70 percent of the world’s [neodymium and praseodymium] and accounts for over 90 percent of the downstream metal and magnet segment.”

To replicate China’s annual output of 50,000 tons, the West would have to invest anywhere between $15 billion and $30 billion, Goldman says.

The Goldman analysis brings into focus the immense challenges associated with decoupling from China — most notably perhaps permitting:

The analysts note that while demand for NdPr could exceed supply from 2028 onward in light of surging demand in the EV and wind turbine segment, “out of more than 20 projects outside China that could produce some 20,000 tons of NdPr annually, (…) only two to three of these projects can get off the ground this decade.”

Both the United States and the European Union have resolved to make permitting reform a key priority. In the U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) just told his colleagues that the push would be a focus in the weeks leading up to the August recess, while the European Union’s recently released Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) calls for streamlining the permitting process for raw materials projects.

However, as followers of ARPN well know, all affirmations of a desire to strengthen domestic supply chains aside, the perennial not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) sentiment is still strong – not just in the United States, but also in Europe.

Meanwhile, the urgency for reform cannot be overstated, as Beijing will not slow down its global quest for resource dominance, and the critical minerals arms race in the context of the Tech Wars will continue to heat up.

The post As China Ratchets Up Weaponization of Trade, Analysts Call for Massive Investments to Counter Beijing in Critical Minerals Arms Race appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

The parades, barbecues, pool parties and fireworks to mark this year’s Independence Day are over.  There’s much to be thankful for, especially at a time when the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine, now in its second year, reverberates around the globe and geopolitical tensions continue to mount.

ARPN has always used the occasion of Independence Day to remind ourselves that “while we cherish the freedom we are blessed with in so many ways, we must not become complacent, as there are areas where we’re increasingly becoming less independent” — with our reliance on foreign mineral resources being a case in point.

Thankfully, stakeholders are increasingly aware of the urgency to strengthen critical mineral supply chains, and, on the heels of a global pandemic, ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, and growing resource nationalism, a flurry of activity has dominated the critical minerals space, ranging from domestic efforts over bilateral trade agreements to multilateral alliances.

For the U.S., a notable example of domestic efforts is the series of DPA Presidential Determinations involving specific Critical Minerals, beginning with President Trump’s July 2019 designation of the Rare Earth permanent magnet supply chain being designated as “essential for the national defense,” followed by President Biden’s designation of what ARPN calls the “Battery Criticals” as DPA Title III eligible in March 2022, followed by Platinum and Palladium in a DPA Presidential Determination in June 2022.  Earlier this spring, two further Presidential Determinations (February 27, 2023 Presidential Determination, and DPA Presidential Determination (2023-5)), effectively created an entirely new category of critical minerals – the “defense criticals” and designated airbreathing engines, advanced avionics navigation and guidance systems, and hypersonic systems and their “constituent materials” as priority DPA materials.

(for more on the Defense Criticals, read our post here.)

Followers of ARPN are further aware of policy initiatives like the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) or the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which are currently being followed by bilateral trade agreements, as well as U.S.-EU discussions to launch a “critical mineral club.”

While the United States and our partners have taken several important steps to decouple critical mineral supply chains from China, Beijing, having systematically built out its dominance across the entire value chain from mining over processing to manufacturing, still has a chokehold on many key critical minerals, and particularly the EV battery supply chain.

And for all of the recent U.S. policy efforts, the latest USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries report confirmed that our critical mineral dependencies still persist.

There is momentum to change this, however, as we have previously argued:

“Those familiar with the inner-workings of Washington, D.C. know all too well that particularly in an election year policy efforts can quickly lose steam or fizzle over attempts to placate certain constituencies. Against all affirmations to strengthen domestic supply chains, the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) sentiment is still strong.”

As followers of ARPN well know, the stakes are too high to let the momentum for comprehensive reform fizzle.

With a new “Great Game” afoot in the global mineral resource realm (see our most recent post on the issue here), the U.S. must double down on its push to secure critical mineral supply chains from “soup to nuts” to borrow a term used by U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm.

With the West’s resource dependence running deep, and Beijing’s determination to continue its global quest for resource dominance unbroken, the critical mineral arms race will continue to heat up.   Stakeholders here and elsewhere must gear up for the long haul.

As ARPN stated in a previous post, Rome wasn’t built in a day.

Neither was the United States of America.

But built it was, challenges were overcome — and we are celebrating the men and women who have fought for and continue to safeguard our freedoms this week.

Here’s hoping that one day we will be able to say the same for the critical mineral supply chains that anchor the technology economies of the 21st Century.

The post Independence Day 2023 — As We Celebrate Our Freedoms, (Resource) Dependency Still Looms Large appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

But small size belies the multiplier effect of Critical Minerals, which can have an outsized impact on the global economy.

On April 20, 2023 Chile’s President Gabriel Boric announced his plan to nationalize the country’s lithium industry to boost the Latin American nation’s industrial base and protect the environment.  Falling short of full nationalization, the proposals envision majority state-owned partnerships with private companies for lithium exploration and production, and would require that the two lithium miners currently operating in the country, Chile’s SQM and U.S. company Albemarle, “negotiate an unspecified state participation in their existing concessions, which run to 2030 and 2043 respectively.”

Considering that Chile is the world’s second largest lithium producer, observers called Boric’s announcement a “shock move,” but in all reality, Chile is only the latest in a series of countries resorting to resource nationalism at a time when critical mineral demand is soaring.  As for the shock effect, Boric’s plans to nationalize mineral operations were well-known.  The shock seems to result from global observers who are still learning to appreciate the importance of parts of the Periodic Table more critical to economic growth than ever before.

But there is something new under the Latin American sun.  As Peter Schechter and Juan Cortiñas outlined in a February 2022 piece for Marsh McLennan’s Brink News ARPN featured at the time, the shunning of laissez-faire economics, particularly in Latin America, is not new. “What’s different this time,” they say, “is that these new interventionist policies are not only focused on the traditional energy sector. Instead, the region’s attention is turning to increasingly valuable minerals that are key to the new green economy quickly gaining momentum across the world.” 

Chile’s move comes on the heels of a comprehensive lithium nationalization plan enacted by Mexico which culminated in President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador signing a decree handing over responsibility for lithium reserves to the country’s energy ministry in February of this year.

Bolivia’s ruling socialists have also favored state control over the nation’s vast untapped mineral resources but are relying on Chinese partners to harness them.

Meanwhile, some speculate that had it not been for his ouster, Peru’s President Pedro Castillo, who won a narrow victory in 2021 and had initially pledged to nationalize much of the country’s mining sector, might have pursued an approach similar to Boric’s in Chile.

While Peru may have bucked the resource nationalism trend, and is now “watching from the sidelines” as it gains steam, for all its resource riches, lithium watchers have their eyes on the last remaining holdout against the region’s statist trend:  Argentina.  There, a number of lithium projects currently in development are open to foreign investment and capital.  But across the region, and with Chile joining Mexico and Bolivia, the Argentinian exception proves the rule.

With resource nationalism rising across the Latin America region, stakeholders in the U.S. must heed the lesson that the best approach to shoring up our own critical mineral supply chains is a comprehensive “All of the Above” approach.

The increasingly popular strategy of “friend shoring” is an important pillar of this approach, and of course, remains highly appealing to policy makers with “not in my backyard (NIMBY)” constituencies.  However, as we previously outlined:

“[Friend shoring] will not be sufficient to meet our vast material needs, particularly as NIMBY-ism is going global.

It’s time we come to terms with the fact that as much as we want to rely on our friends and allies, this can only be part of our critical mineral resource strategy.  To succeed and remain competitive in the 21st Century, we will also have to harness our arguably vast domestic resource potential across the entire value chain — from mine to manufacturing.”

The post Chile’s Plans to Take Control over Country’s Lithium Industry Part of Larger Resource Nationalism Trend appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Followers of ARPN know all too well, and our friends at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence clearly visualized this fact in an infographic last fall: the United States has long been at the mercy of China when it comes to securing our EV battery supply chains, which sit at the heart of the green energy transition.

For your convenience, here’s the visual again:

As the Wall Street Journal outlines in its video clip, the “U.S. lags in most steps of the battery making-process, from sourcing raw materials to assembling components.” 

Whether or not the U.S. can overcome these disadvantages remains to be seen — the WSJ points to the United States’ efforts to build out domestic mining and processing capabilities and leverage partnerships, but also rightfully points out that both approaches are fraught with immense challenges, which range from long permitting timelines for mining and processing projects to the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) movement going global.

However “Herculean,” in the words of the WSJ,  the task may be — against the backdrop of ever-increasing tensions between the United States and China, and with demand for critical minerals; be it the “battery criticals” or the “defense criticals;” soaring to unprecedented heights, there is no alternative to decoupling U.S. supply chains from China, and the sooner stakeholders come to term with this reality, the better.

Watch the video clip here. 

The post Video Clip: U.S. Lags in Most Steps of the EV Battery Making Process – Decoupling “Herculean” Task appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Ali points to the inherent irony of the green energy transition — renewable technologies requiring vast and increasing amounts of metals and minerals like lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt, manganese and REEs, but the U.S. Administration finding itself in a bind with the climate movement, a core part of President Joe Biden’s base, not wanting to mine them, “certainly not close to home.”

Ali cites the January 2023 Boundary Waters decision, in which the U.S. Department of the Interior closed over 350 square miles of the Superior National Forest in northeastern Minnesota – an area that holds some of the nation’s largest undeveloped deposits of copper and nickel but is also known for its pristine lakes — to mineral and geothermal leasing for twenty years.

Arguing that while the “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) sentiment has gone global – Ali points to Serbia’s Jadar lithium mining project being stopped in response to environmentalist pressures — the “United States seems particularly stuck.”  

(See ARPN’S coverage of the NIMBY movement here.)

Relying on allies, such as Australia and Canada, and countries with “controversial domestic-labour policies and environmental standards, including Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” rather than developing its own resources has led to the U.S. yielding to China which has “benefited from the uncompromising US opposition to domestic mining and has built up a formidable dominance in critical metal extraction and processing over the past 30 years.”

Ali notes that while “[m]ining has a sordid history of exploitation and plunder, particularly with respect to Indigenous people,” “contemporary mines with regulatory oversight can have workable impact–benefit agreements with communities,” citing specific examples exemplifying such agreements, including Voisey’s Bay nickel mine in Canada and Red Dog Mine in Alaska, which preferentially employ Indigenous people, respect traditional hunting seasons and include incremental royalties and partial resource ownership.

Ali suggests:

“The country is in danger of forgetting one of the four laws of ecology that Barry Commoner (…) established in his 1971 book A Closing Circle: ‘There is no such thing as a free lunch.’ All industrial activities have some ecological impact. As researchers, and as informed societies, we must consider the benefits and trade-offs in concert.”

adding that

“as the world prepares for the 2023 COP28 climate conference — where even free conference lunches are not really free — the United States should revisit Commoner’s wisdom: there is virtue in embracing tough trade-offs.”

All in all, a welcome if somewhat unexpected proposition coming in an article from (mostly) peer-reviewed Nature.

The post Nature Magazine Column Calls on U.S. to “Embrace Tough Trade-Offs” and “Get Serious” About Domestic Mining to Support Green Energy Shift appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

2022 surely was as fast-paced a year as they come.

Didn’t we just throw overboard our New Year’s Resolutions?  We blinked, and it’s time for another review of what has happened in the past twelve months.

So with no further ado, here is ARPN’s annual attempt to take stock of what has happened on the critical mineral resources front in 2022 — to assess where we are, and, filled with hope for a New Year, where we are headed. 

Early 2022 —

As Covid Pressures Fade, Geopolitical and National Security Concerns Mount, While the Global Push Towards Net Zero Carbon Emissions Intensifies

Coming off two years of a global pandemic affecting virtually every aspect of our lives, the world was ready to take a collective deep breath.

The severity of the coronavirus strains had lessened, vaccines, therapeutics and treatment methods for Covid-19 became more readily available, many restrictions had been loosened or dropped, and global supply chains appeared to slowly recover and reorganize from the strain of lockdowns.

In the U.S. domestic critical minerals realm, against the backdrop of the accelerating global green energy transition, it appeared that stakeholders had learned their pandemic-induced lesson as the 2021 Biden Administration’s 100 Day Supply Chain report and subsequent policy statements pointed towards the adoption of an “all of the above” approach to mineral resource policy to strengthen North American supply chains and decouple from adversaries, and especially China.   (see our 2021 Year in Review post for more)

However, any sense of collective relief was short-lived.

Only weeks into 2022, geopolitical tensions were rising fast with China and Russia declaring a “no limits” partnership in the face of what both nations perceived as “interference in the internal affairs” of other states by “some forces representing a minority on the world stage” which “continue to advocate unilateral approaches to resolving international problems and resort to military policy.”  

Resource nationalism began rearing its head in the Southern Hemisphere, which, often overlooked in the policy discourse, is no less crucial in the global race for critical mineral resources and has emerged as a major source of renewable energy metals and minerals.  Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, which form the so-called Lithium Triangle — home to more than half of the world’s known lithium reserves — were central to this new development, but other countries in the region, like Mexico, are also in the critical minerals business.  Specific developments varied from country to country (for more on the issue click here), but in each case, the trend toward resource nationalism was unmistakable.

Against the backdrop of a global lithium market expected to grow by 500% in the next 35 years, developers in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and possibly Peru were even reportedly evaluating the possibility of creating an OPEC-like lithium cartel.  While observers contended that it was “important not to confuse this resource nationalism with predictions of a highly ideological leftward turn,” the underlying implications for U.S. critical mineral resource supply chains as U.S. demand for lithium and other green energy critical materials continues to grow are not to be dismissed.

Meanwhile, countries around the globe forged ahead with their pursuit of net zero carbon emissions, with up to 20 countries to date having have announced phase-out bans on internal combustion engine car sales over the next 10 to 30 years.

But the watershed moment for 2022 was undoubtedly Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.  While the ongoing war has serious implications for European energy supply, the ramifications of Russia’s actions stretch well beyond oil and natural gas, and well beyond Europe.

Russia’s war on Ukraine set off a potential realignment of critical mineral resource supply chains that warrants attention.  Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has largely isolated it on the global front both diplomatically and economically, and, with sweeping sanctions taking hold, the Western world has turned elsewhere to meet certain critical mineral needs previously supplied by Russian companies and halted shipments of materials to the Russian Federation. Unsurprisingly for followers of ARPN, Russian buyers began turning to China to plug shortfalls.

As ARPN cautioned earlier this year:

“While to date, Beijing has walked a carefully calculated line on Russia’s war on Ukraine emphasizing its concern with violence while maintaining the need to respect territorial integrity and security interests of all parties, China stands to gain major strategic opportunities from filling the void left by a Western business pullout from the Russian market, both in terms of imports and exports. China will also be able to further its grip on global critical minerals via access to Russia’s vast mineral riches.”

By mid-March of 2022, a confluence of factors — pandemic-induced supply chain shocks, increasing resource nationalism in various parts of the world, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — had completely altered the Post-Cold War geopolitical landscape and mineral resource security calculus.

Critical Mineral Security = National Security. President Joe Biden Invokes Defense Production Act 

Responding to the resulting growing pressures on critical mineral supply chains and skyrocketing demand scenarios, U.S. President Joe Biden invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA) to encourage domestic production of the metals and minerals deemed critical for electric vehicle and large capacity batteries via Presidential Determination No. 2022-1.

The Presidential Determination instructs the Secretary of Defense to “create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore sustainable and responsible domestic production capabilities of such strategic and critical materials by supporting feasibility studies for mature mining, beneficiation, and value-added processing projects; by-product and co-product production at existing mining, mine waste reclamation, and other industrial facilities; mining, beneficiation, and value-added processing modernization to increase productivity, environmental sustainability, and workforce safety; and any other such activities authorized under section 303(a)(1) of the Act.”

Observers and stakeholders hoped that the presidential determination would “oil the wheels of domestic mining and refining” by “funding easy wins” and “low hanging fruit,” as Simon Moores, Managing Director of Benchmark Mineral Intelligence phrased it, and set the stage for subsequent additional steps to support domestic mining and processing projects.

Mid 2022 –

A New Great Game?

Post-Cold War Realignment Spurs Domestic and Global Efforts to Strengthen Critical Mineral Supply Chains

Over the course of the following weeks and months, awareness of the importance of securing critical mineral supply chains and decoupling from adversaries, i.e. China, against the backdrop of an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape and mounting environmental pressures continued to grow, not just domestically, but also amongst the United States’ key allies.

In the eyes of Globe and Mail (Canada) columnist Robert Muggah, the geopolitics of mineral resource supply had triggered a new “Great Game” -   a term coined by British writer Rudyard Kipling to describe the “fierce competition between Victorian Britain and Tsarist Russia, both of which sought to control South Asia and Africa” which “went on to shape geopolitics for much of the rest of the 19th and 20th centuries.”

Said new Great Game, according to Muggah, foreshadowed by the 2010 rare earths dispute between China and Japan, gained momentum with the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 which committed countries to significantly reduce greenhouse gases and transition to renewables, and prompted Western nations to rethink and reorganize their supply chains.

As director of the Payne Institute and professor of public policy at the Colorado School of Mines Morgan Bazilian, and postdoctoral fellow at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University Gregory Brew suggest:

“Where the 20th century featured battles over access to oil, the 21st century will likely be defined by a struggle over critical minerals, particularly as the United States views China as a global competitor and strives to limit its reliance on Chinese supplies for EV manufacturing and a wide variety of energy and defense technologies.”

In July, the United States and allied countries announced the formation of a new cooperative initiative to bolster critical mineral supplies. The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) comprises the United States, Canada, Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission, and seeks to “ensure that critical minerals are produced, processed, and recycled in a manner that supports the ability of countries to realize the full economic development benefit of their geological endowments.”

Observers like Reuter’s Andy Home posited that the formation of the MSP might signify a post-Cold War “tectonic realignment with far-reaching implications” as it — against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine and mounting tension with China — is “defined as much as anything by who is not on the invite list — China and Russia.” Arguing that a “previously highly globalized minerals supply network looks set to split into politically polarized spheres of influence” he suggested that a “metallic NATO [was] starting to take shape, though no-one [was] calling it that just yet.”

U.S. Congress “Net-Zeroes” in on Critical Mineral Supply Chains, Passes Inflation Reduction Act

In August of 2022, the U.S. Congress passed and President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act, which includes combined investments of $369 billion aimed at reducing carbon emissions by roughly 40% by the end of this decade.

A swath of significant clean energy tax credits aims at increasing domestic energy production while at the same time accelerating energy innovation abroad.

The package further includes funding for tax credits and rebates for consumers buying electric vehicles, installing solar panels or making other energy-efficiency upgrades to their homes, including, a credit of $4,000 for lower-and middle-income individuals purchasing used EVs, and up to $7,500 tax credits for EVs.  These represent a renewal of the existing $7,500 electric vehicle Federal tax credit starting in January of 2023, and carrying it through until the end of 2032. The former 200,000-vehicle cap is removed and all manufacturers will have access to the credits if they comply with the other requirements in the package.

However – and of considerable interest for followers of ARPN — a new requirement is that qualified cars must be assembled in North America, and adhere to mandated “escalating levels of critical minerals to be sourced from the U.S. or a country with a free-trade agreement with the U.S.”

Experts like John Adams, U.S. Army brigadier general (ret.), believed the sourcing requirements for the battery materials contained in the package would become key to addressing “emerging energy security vulnerabilities before they are intractable crises,” while others have cautioned that because the auto industry was so heavily reliant on battery materials and components from China that the requirement would represent an almost insurmountable challenge in light of lagging timelines for mine permitting.  These concerns notwithstanding, the provisions have sent a strong signal to investors that the United States is serious about “building the secure responsible industrial base our economy and national security needs,” kicking off a flurry of activity in the industry.

Fall/Winter 2022 –

Regulatory Changes Prompt Rethink As China Tightens Reins on Supply Chains 

Energy Provisions in Inflation Reduction Act Spur Efforts to Build Out U.S. Battery Supply Chain, as States Step Up Their Own Efforts

In October of 2022, As part of the implementation of the 2021 infrastructure law, the U.S. Department of Energy announced the first round of funding under the Act for projects aimed at “supercharging” U.S. manufacturing of batteries for electric vehicles and electric grid.

Awardees — a total of 20 companies — will receive a combined $2.8 billion “to build and expand commercial scale facilities in 12 states to extract and process lithium, graphite and other battery materials, manufacture components, and demonstrate new approaches, including manufacturing components from recycled materials.”

Meanwhile, adapting to “recent regulatory changes and intensifying competition over key battery raw materials,” automakers, miners and suppliers have begun to rethink and reorganize their critical mineral supply chains.  ARPN featured several examples (see here and here) of new offtake agreements  and contracts between battery makers and mining companies – and even states and cities are getting in on the action, entering into partnerships with and offering incentive packages to mining companies to cultivate a “vertically integrate supply chain that will help companies increase efficiencies by reducing the reliance on imported materials,” as Georgia Governor Bryan P. Kempdescribed the rationale for a new battery plant construction partnership in Georgia.

Tying into the overall push towards net zero carbon emissions, these agreements increasingly leverage advances in materials science and technology as the mining industry has made strides towards balancing modern mining practices and environmental protections in the quest to sustainably green our future.

For more examples of initiatives by mining companies to significantly reduce carbon emissions or even “close the loop,” take a look here, here and here.

Xi’s China – Beijing’s Tightening of Reins Underscores Urgency of Decoupling Critical Mineral Supply Chains from China

Also in October, China’s Communist Party confirmed President Xi Jinping for another term in office.  In what effectively amounted to a “coronation,” as the Wall Street Journal editorial board phrased it, the CCP’s move has effectively “confirm[ed] China’s combination of aggressive nationalism and Communist ideology that is the single biggest threat to world freedom.”  Xi has since reaffirmed the need to increase China’s self-sufficiency in technology and supply chains, and China’s commitment to attaining control over Taiwan — a key point of contention in the country’s relations with the United States, which have already starkly deteriorated in recent years.  According to the Wall Street Journal, the “coronation” “all but guarantees an era of confrontation between China and the U.S.”

Earlier this summer, Beijing had established a new state-owned group to serve as a consolidated hub for the country’s iron ore trade with a registered capital of 20 billion yuan ($3 billion).  China Mineral Resources Group’s mandate covers mining, ore processing and trading.  As mining.com outlines, the company’s creation was “encouraged and closely monitored” by senior government officials in Beijing.   These Chinese officials have repeatedly accused the United States and its allies of “ganging up to try to suppress China’s global rise,” and consider the formation of a consolidated trading platform a “way to strengthen the country’s negotiating position in an unfriendly international environment.”  

Since then, with a newly emboldened Xi at the helm, the Chinese government has been actively tightening the reins on its critical mineral supply chains. Most recently, according to news reports, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced plans to increase its supervision of China’s lithium battery supply chain, which, according to the ministry, is “severely unbalanced.”

Efforts to decouple supply chains from China may become “all the more pressing in light of current fears that (…) China may retaliate after the U.S. Department of Commerce announced sweeping limitations to semiconductor and chip-making equipment sales to Chinese customers this fall.” 

2022 Reality Check

– The Real World Challenges of “Decoupling” -

Against the backdrop of a growing realization that “China has big footed a lot of the technology and supply chains that could end up making us vulnerable if we don’t develop our own supply chains,” as U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm phrased it earlier this summer, the push to decouple critical mineral supply chains from China has been one of the emerging key trend lines of 2022.

However, in spite of having made it de facto policy, it appears that Biden Administration officials are becoming increasingly wary of the term “decoupling” – as evidenced most recently by U.S. Secretary of Commerce stating explicitly that the United States is “not seeking a decoupling from China” in a policy speech on U.S. Competition with China.  This development may be rooted in the fact that, in light of the complexity of critical mineral supply chains, the process of “decoupling” is fraught with more significant real world challenges than some would have thought.

Earlier this summer, a RealClearInvestigations exposé discussed the alleged China connections of a domestic lithium extraction project in Nevada, where, as RealClear’s Steve Miller writes “a Chinese-dominated mining company has procured millions of dollars in American subsidies to extract lithium in the United States – but, given a dearth of U.S. processing capacity, the mineral is likely to be sent to China with no guarantee that the end product would return as batteries to power President Biden’s envisioned green economy.

The Nevada project is still in the permitting process, but similar scenarios have already unfolded elsewhere, such as in the case of rare earths magnets used in engine parts for F-35 fighter jets, where the U.S. Department of Defense has resorted to granting a waiver for sourcing requirements because at the current time acquisition of parts without Chinese components is not possible.  While the U.S.’s national security imperatives may make a rare earth waiver unavoidable, it should serve to turbo-charge domestic rare earth supply chain development to break the U.S. Armed Services’ Chinese rare earth dependency once and for all.

Of course, experts have long warned that decoupling supply chains for lithium, for example represents a formidable challenge.

As Simon Moores, chief executive of Benchmark Mineral Intelligence argued in the wake of the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, “[c]onsidering it takes seven years to build a mine and refining plant but only 24 months to build a battery plant, the best part of this decade is needed to establish an entirely new industry in the United States.”

Meanwhile, the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) challenge, becoming increasingly prominent in 2021, continues to represent a significant hurdle for shoring up domestic supply chain security, particularly as it now appears that its newest manifestation, “virtual weaponized NIMBYism” in the form of concerted cyber warfare campaigns in which networks of inauthentic accounts across social media platforms, websites and forums pose as local residents opposed to certain mining or processing projects.

(see our post on virtual weaponized NIMBYism here) 

Interestingly, and underscoring that the critical minerals challenge has gone mainstream it was CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, who put his finger on the crux of the issue stakeholders are currently grappling with in a TV segment this summer. He said:

“The minerals industry isn’t as popular as renewable energy – particularly on the Left. There are real environmental hazards. But if people want to protect the planet from climate change and authoritarian powers, they will have to get onboard with new mineral projects.”

While pointing to the importance of other components that ARPN has consistently highlighted as part of a comprehensive “all-of-the-above” approach to mineral resource security – recycling and closed-loop solutions as well as increased R&D in the materials science arena – Zakaria closed his segment as follows:

“This will have to remain a priority for years and years to come. For the sake of the planet and international security, we will need to dig deep, quite literally.” 

2022 – Metals in Focus

Government Critical Minerals List, Rare Earths and the Battery Criticals 

While USGS released its second government critical minerals list in February of 2022 (an update to the 2018 list of 35) featuring 50 metals and minerals deemed critical to United States national security and economic wellbeing, this year’s media coverage might have you believe that all that matters when it comes to securing critical mineral supply chains, is the rare earths and the battery criticals (Lithium, Cobalt, Graphite, Nickel, and Manganese).

And even here, initially, lithium appeared to steal the spotlight – after all, much of the green energy transition is fueled by Lithium-Ion technology.

In recent months, this has shifted.

Cobalt

With the U.S. Department of Labor including lithium-ion batteries into its “list of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor” – a list of 158 goods from 77 countries assumed to be produced in violation of international standards regarding child or forced labor, tracking the cobalt supply chain is becoming increasingly important and the added scrutiny of labor practices for cobalt adds increased urgency for U.S. policy and other stakeholders to build out a North American supply chain.

Nickel

With Indonesia’s investment minister hinting at the possibility of Jakarta pursuing the creation of an OPEC-like cartelfor nickel (and other key battery materials), the spotlight is falling on nickel.

the looming specter of battery material cartelization – first introduced earlier this year by South American Lithium producers — should be reason enough for U.S. stakeholders to kick the buildout of domestic battery supply chains into high gear wherever possible.

As recent U.S. developments suggest, efforts are already underway.

The first recipients of federal funding disbursed under the 2021 infrastructure law to “supercharge” U.S. manufacturing of batteries for electric vehicles and the electric grid included the Tamarack Nickel Project in central Minnesota.  As ARPN has noted, the project had previously been awarded  $2.2 million  to fund an effort to achieve carbon capture by a process that mineralizes the carbon in rock – a process far more stable than methods that inject carbon, where it remains vulnerable to seepage and fracturing due to earthquakes.  Bringing the supply chain home could not only inoculate the U.S. from trade issues on the critical minerals front, but could also help reduce the industry’s — arguably large — carbon footprint.

Graphite

Graphite has also entered the chat.  As the key raw material in the battery anode, graphite is the largest component of lithium-ion batteries by weight. In light of “phenomenal demand growth from the EV battery sector and delays to new capacity as well as rising power costs,” the graphite supply chain represents a significant and growing challenge for automakers looking to reduce the carbon footprint of the materials they use for their EVs.

Currently, according to the USGS, the United States is 100% import dependent for its graphite needs, but as ARPN recently pointed out,

“that’s not for lack of known graphite resources.  As USGS noted in February 2022 in its updated U.S. Mineral Deposit Database, Graphite One’s Graphite Creek deposit near Nome, Alaska is America’s largest graphite deposit.  If U.S. Government efforts to develop an American-based EV and lithium-ion battery supply chain have any hope of succeeding, looking for ways to help projects like Graphite Creek down the path to production will be, in a word…. Critical.”

Until then, China’s battery anode dominance could be the West’s Achilles heel in the green energy transition – in defense planners parlance, a potential “single point of failure”:  irrespective of whether we succeed in developing multiple minerals and metals for the battery cathode, if we are unable to meet anode material needs – and we cannot do so sustainably and ESG-friendly without natural graphite — we will not be able to build a rechargeable battery independent of China.

New Focus: The Super-Criticals 

Altogether, a new set of critical minerals appears emerge as a key priority for stakeholders.

What ARPN has dubbed the “super-criticals” – the five battery materials, plus a sub-set of five rare earths required for permanent magnets (neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium and samarium) altogether comprise a group of 10 criticals within the 50 critical minerals on the official U.S. government list, and many of the efforts to build out a secure North American critical minerals supply chain are focused on this group of materials.  By June, courtesy of another DPA Presidential Determination, platinum and palladium pushed the super-critical list to 12.

All-of-the-Above and Supply Chains in 2022

At the end of 2021, ARPN suggested that if the term “supply chain” could “move from jargon to meme in 2021,” maybe 2022 could be the year that strengthening supply chains could “move from rhetoric to reality” – and in some ways it was.

As outlined above, much progress was made, including important groundwork to build out a secure North American critical minerals supply chain.  However, much more remains to be done, and to overcome the many challenges, new alliances will need to be forged.

As Shane Lasley argues in Critical Minerals Alliances 2022, a magazine covering 29 metals and minerals (when counting rare earths as 14)  deemed critical to North American supply chains as well as related policy issues:

 “The optimum solution to laying the foundation for the next epoch of human progress will only be discovered through the forging of unlikely alliances between the woke and old school, environmental conservationists and natural resource developers, liberals and conservatives, national laboratories and private sector entrepreneurs, local stakeholders and global mining companies, venture capitalists and innovators, and everyone else with visions of a cleaner, greener, and high-tech future.”

And so the stage is set for 2023, as decisions to come will determine national fortunes and human progress in decades ahead.

The post 2022 – ARPN’s YEAR IN REVIEW appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

The U.S. Department of Labor has included lithium-ion batteries into its “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor” – a list of 158 goods from 77 countries assumed to be produced in violation of internationals standards regarding child or forced labor.

As Mining.com reports, “[t]the addition of Li-ion batteries to the list is not due to direct evidence of labor abuses in the final production of this good, but because of the evidence of human exploitation in the mining of cobalt, a key input in the production of the technology.”

The Democratic Republic of Congo supplies more than 70% of the world’s cobalt, and labor practices in the country have long been scrutinized by the global community, including the United States.

The Department of Labor first placed cobalt, specifically referred to as “cobalt ore” on its List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, and a year later, Congress included language in the Dodd-Frank financial law targeting the sale of conflict minerals from the DRC to address profits from commodities mined in Congo, but they stopped short of including cobalt,  and only focused on gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten.

In 2016, Amnesty International released a report on child labor at the DRC’s so-called “artisanal” informal mine sites, increasing international scrutiny, but fast forward to 2022, and child labor persists in the DRC.  Today, according to the Department of Labor report, “it is increasingly linked to the global supply chain of products made with cobalt, including lithium-ion batteries that power our smartphones, laptops, and electric cars,” leading the agency to dedicate a separate writeup to outlining  “How Batteries Are Powered by Child Labor.”

Writes Valentina Ruiz Leotard for Mining.com:

“One of the main conclusions in the report is that as the world is shifting toward generating clean and renewable energy, it is important for companies to track the cobalt supply chain by acquiring knowledge of trade data, supplier information, transport routes, and processing steps. 

Demanding such information and conducting their own research, will give companies ‘fewer excuses—such as the distance between raw materials and the finished product or supply chain complexity—to point to their lack of accountability in determining if a supply chain is tainted with child labor or forced labor,’ the reports states.”

The added scrutiny of labor practices for cobalt also adds increased urgency for U.S. policy and other stakeholders to build out a North American supply chain for the “battery criticals” lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel and manganese — which already has received fresh impetus with the passage of the sourcing requirements contained in the statutory language on EV credits in the recently-passed Inflation Reduction Act.

Efforts are underway. To stick with cobalt — in Idaho, America’s first and only cobalt mine in decades opened earlier this month, and while it “will be a while before we can actually say that this is going to be a growth industry,” as Brad Martin, director of the RAND National Security Supply Chain Institute says, it is a “geopolitically significant” development for the United States and a small first step away from relying on materials sourced from a country using child labor practices.

However, in light of the multifaceted challenges relating to building out domestic mining and processing capacity, ranging from permitting issues to to politically-motivated NIMBYism, we still have a long way to go until the Department of Labor will be able to drop lithium-ion batteries from its watch list, and we have a fully built-out North American supply chain for the battery criticals.

The post DoL “List of Goods Produced By Child Labor or Forced Labor” Zeroes in on Lithium-Ion Batteries, Adding Pressures for Already Strained Material Supply Chains appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

Earlier this summer, the U.S. Department of the Interior announced it had set aside more than $74 million to invest in research and mapping of areas that show potential for critical mineral development under the USGS Earth Mapping Resources Initiative (Earth MRI) to be distributed across thirty states.

Most of the funding was contained in the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) enacted in the fall of 2021.

Said U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), who, along with U.S. Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va) was a key champion of the infrastructure package:

“Allowing America’s foreign mineral dependence to continue is not only a risk to our national security but is a hindrance to our ability to maintain a robust domestic supply chain. (…) By improving the research and data surrounding critical minerals, we will be able to better pinpoint what locations in the U.S. hold the greatest opportunities for responsible resource production. We will also further improve our ability to harvest those resources in the most environmentally responsible and sustainable manner possible.”

As supply chain challenges unearthed by the coronavirus pandemic persist, Moscow’s resolve to continue its relentless assault on Ukraine appears unbroken, and resource nationalism is not only rearing its head in South and Central America, but also in Southeast Asia. As such, the need for the United States and its allies to secure critical mineral resource supply chains underpinning 21st century technologies and in particular the shift towards net zero carbon, is becoming more and more pressing.

Last summer, the Biden Administration embraced an “all-of-the-above” critical minerals strategy in its 100 Day Supply Chain review and subsequent policy statements. Efforts to promote closed-loop technologies, recycling and “friend-shoring” have garnered broad-based support, but the same could not be said for initiatives aimed at strengthening domestic resource production and processing, and NIMBY-ism began rearing its head in Washington, DC. However, the urgency of the situation and the mineral intensity of a low carbon future has begun to resonate with stakeholders, particularly as it becomes more evident that “friend-shoring” can be an important piece of the American resource puzzle, but is no panacea.

The invocation of the Defense Production Act in March by President Biden via Presidential Determination to accelerate buildout of domestic supply chains for battery criticals bears testament to this development, and the funding of domestic mapping initiatives via the infrastructure package can further pave the way towards more resource security by helping garner a “better scientific understanding of critical mineral resources available in the country, including minerals found in mine waste materials.”

The post Mapping of Domestic Critical Minerals Prioritized in Context of All-of-the-Above Approach to Supply Chain Security appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.

The U.S. Department of Defense has announced that it is investigating a recently-unearthed disinformation campaign against Australian company Lynas Rare Earths, which is contracted to construct a REE separation facility in Texas.

Cybersecurity firm Mandiant first reported the efforts of Dragonbridge, a network of “thousands of inauthentic accounts across numerous social media platforms, websites, and forums that have promoted various narratives in support of the political interests of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” targeting the Australian Miner with content aimed at discrediting the company’s environmental record and instigating local protests of the company’s planned processing facility by posing as local residents on social media.

While, according to Mandiant, the campaign to date hasn’t been particularly sophisticated, the company has warned that its analysts expect the network to refine its technique as broadens its effort. In June, Dragonbridge began targeting additional REE mining companies, notably Canadian Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp., which is exploring a project in Saskatchewan, Canada, and American REE supplier USA Rare Earth, LLC., with a REE mining project in Texas and a planned processing and magnet manufacturing facility in Oklahoma, with similar disinformation and negative messaging campaigns.

As Metal Tech News’s Shane Lasley writes in a new piece for the publication, “[g]iven the economic and geopolitical clout rare earths provide the People’s Republic of China, it is no surprise that the government would sponsor a social media attack on projects that threaten this leverage.”

Followers of ARPN are well-aware of China’s long-standing near-total supply chain monopoly on Rare Earths and know that Beijing is no stranger to weaponizing these tech metals.  The fact that it now appears to engage in cyber warfare aimed at private companies leveraging a “unique attack vector” by weaponizing the NIMBY sentiment should place industry stakeholders and policymakers on high alert, because as John Hultquist, vice president of Mandiant Threat Intelligence, told Defense One:

“One of the things that’s distinct about Chinese activity, compared to some of their peers, is that they’re always highly economically focused. There’s a whole new group of targets that probably don’t have strong experience dealing with this problem. As that process gets underway, more industries will find themselves the same sort of strategic situation that rare earth metals are now.”

In the words of Metal Tech News’s Lasley, “the China rare earths dragon awakens.” The question is, are we ready?

The post The Newest Frontier in the Global Resource Wars: Virtual Weaponized NIMBYism appeared first on American Resources Policy Network.