China

“Solar power, electric cars, grid-scale batteries, heat pumps—the world is crossing into a mass-adoption moment for green technologies,” writes Tom Randall for Bloomberg.  Citing Bloomberg research, he argues that “clean energy has a tipping point, and 87 countries have reached it.” 

The mass-adoption of green technologies, as followers of ARPN well know, requires drastically increased amounts of critical minerals, including the Rare Earths and mainstays such as copper, as well as, perhaps most notably, the so-called “battery criticals” lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel and manganese — key  inputs for EV battery technology, which is at the heart of the green energy transition.

Randall writes that the U.S. has passed a “critical EV tipping point: 5% of new car sales powered only by batteries,”and argues that “[i]f the U.S follows the trend established by 18 countries that preceded it, a quarter of new car sales could be electric by the end of 2025.”

These emerging trend lines, along with the realization that supply chains for many metals and minerals leave us at the mercy of adversary nations like China who control much of the material supplies and processing capabilities, have prompted the Biden Administration and members of Congress to finally give the critical mineral supply chain conundrum ARPN and others have long warned of the attention it deserves.

Thus, in recent years, stakeholders began taking steps to strengthen domestic supply chains for critical minerals, with the supply chain chaos resulting from coronavirus pandemic and rising geopolitical tensions kicking these efforts into high gear in 2022.

Much of these efforts have focused on the rare earths and battery criticals, such as the March 2022 Presidential Determination to invoke the Defense Production Act for these materials, which grants the  federal government the authority to direct taxpayer funds to private companies for the extraction of said minerals.

However, untangling the supply chains is proving more difficult than some would have thought — and new sourcing requirements for the battery criticals contained in the energy provisions of the the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act may have added another layer of complications to an already challenging situation.

Earlier this summer, a RealClearInvestigations exposé discussed the alleged China connections of a domestic lithium extraction project in Nevada, where, as RealClear’s Steve Miller writes “a Chinese-dominated mining company has procured millions of dollars in American subsidies to extract lithium in the United States – but, given a dearth of U.S. processing capacity, the mineral is likely to be sent to China with no guarantee that the end product would return as batteries to power President Biden’s envisioned green economy.”   U.S. Senator Tom Cotton recently called for additional information from the Department of Energy regarding the alleged China connection of the project, which we  discussed here.

The Nevada project is is still in the permitting process, but similar scenarios have already unfolded elsewhere, such as in the case of rare earths magnets used in engine parts for F-35 fighter jets, where the U.S. Department of Defense has resorted to granting a waiver for sourcing requirements because at the current time acquisition of parts without Chinese components is not possible.  While the U.S.’s national security imperatives may make a rare earth waiver unavoidable, it should serve to turbo-charge domestic rare earth supply chain development to break the U.S. Armed Services’ Chinese rare earth dependency once and for all.

In the same vein, as Miller writes discussing the above-referenced project in Nevada, “critics say the scenario would increase U.S. energy dependence on a hostile power – one accused of using forced labor in the manufacture of both lithium batteries and solar panels – and undercuts the Biden administration’s emphasis on domestic sourcing of green energy,” experts have long warned that decoupling supply chains for lithium, for example represents a formidable challenge.

As Simon Moores, chief executive of Benchmark Mineral Intelligence argued in the wake of the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, “[c]onsidering it takes seven years to build a mine and refining plant but only 24 months to build a battery plant, the best part of this decade is needed to establish an entirely new industry in the United States.”

Both assertions are accurate — yet, as we previously outlined:

“Senator Cotton’s point [regarding the Nevada project] that questions of foreign control deserve to be fully investigated before the U.S. Government confers funding seems unarguable. Government programs intended to alleviate worrisome foreign resource dependencies should not unwittingly strengthen those dependencies at the expense of the American taxpayer – and American national security.”

As clean energy adoption reaches a “tipping point,” this is all the more reason for stakeholders to place an even stronger emphasis on formulating and implementing a comprehensive “all-of-the-above” strategy for domestic critical mineral resource supply chain security — today.

With the coronavirus pandemic and growing geopolitical tensions having shone a light on U.S. over-reliance on foreign sources across our nation’s critical mineral value chains and its implications for our national and economic security, domestic stakeholders have stepped up their efforts to decouple U.S. supply chains from reliance on our adversaries.

While for “battery criticals” the most recent notable step was the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) with its sourcing requirements for lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel and manganese, measures addressing rare earth element supply chains included the invocation of Title III of the Defense Production Act for Rare Earth Elements and a DoD allocation of $35 million for a heavy rare earth separation and processing project in California.

While these are important steps, real-life examples show just how deep our nation’s over-reliance really is:

Earlier this fall, the Pentagon, as part of its “efforts to decouple U.S. defense companies’ sprawling global supply chains from China,” as the Wall Street Journal phrases it, said it had begun using artificial intelligence to analyze whether U.S. military contractors source aircraft parts, electronics and raw materials used in U.S. military equipment from China and/or other potential adversaries.

Learning that engine parts for new F-35 combat jets made by Lockheed Martin Corp. contained magnets sourced from Honeywell International, Inc. with a cobalt samarium metal alloy produced in China — which constituted a violation of U.S. procurement laws — the Defense Department last month halted accepting new jets from the company.

The company has since  been granted a waiver, and with it, the Pentagon will accept all aircraft under the contract.

The waiver was granted because the “magnet does not transmit information or harm aircraft, and […] there are no security risks involved,” but Honeywell will have to work to find an alternative source for the metal alloy used in the F-35 engine parts.

Meanwhile, analysts say that with the waiver allowing an alloy of Chinese origins to continue to be used in the manufacture of F-35 combat jets, “the US military has exposed its dependence on Chinese rare-earth products, and China can opt to limit the export of such strategic resources to safeguard its national security.”

China, not surprisingly, is an interested observer in the U.S. supply chain travails.  As the Global Times reports, citing a manager of a Chinese state-owned rare earth enterprise in Ganzhou, East China’s Jiangxi province, with China having a leading edge in the middle-to downstream rare earth magnet production, the “U.S. attempt to remove China-origin alloy imports from military equipment is almost ‘a mission impossible.’ from both a short-term and long-term perspective.” According to unnamed manager, “China is the only country in the world that has developed the ability to extract samarium and cobalt rare-earth metals, which means the middle product samarium oxide is almost 100 percent made in Chinese factories. We also account for over 70 percent of the final product samarium-cobalt rare-earth magnet. How can Washington take out Chinese rare-earth products from its jets in such a scenario?“

A similar dependency applies to China-made neodymium magnets.

A Beijing-based military expert, Wei Dongxu, contacted by the Global Times argued that with the U.S. using the materials for military purposes, which could “harm China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and development interests,” “China should consider applying more strict export controls on rare earth products.”

The waiver referenced above is only the latest in a series of waivers granted by Pentagon officials under similar circumstances — all of which goes to show how difficult it is to untangle critical mineral supply chains.

However, with geopolitical and trade tensions rising — both between the United States and China and generally on the global stage — and with China’s known penchant for using its advantage as leverage, there is no alternative to turbo-charging the effort to secure U.S. domestic supply chains for critical minerals across the board.

As geopolitical tensions between China and the West are on the rise, and critical mineral supply chain pressures continue to mount against the backdrop of the accelerating green energy transition, U.S. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm demanding information from her department regarding recent reports that the Department of [...]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent additional supply chain challenges have prompted the European Union — already grappling with strained supply chains in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic — to step up its critical minerals game. During her State of the Union address on September 14, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen announced [...]

In a new piece for Canada’s Globe and Mail, columnist Robert Muggah zeroes in on the geopolitics of mineral resource supply, which have, in his view, triggered a new “Great Game” – a term coined by British writer Rudyard Kipling to describe the “fierce competition between Victorian Britain and Tsarist Russia, both of which sought to control South Asia [...]

In a new piece for Canada’s Globe and Mail, Niall Mcgee discusses China’s quiet but systematic campaign to corner the critical minerals segment in Canada and stakeholder reactions in Ottawa, or more precisely, the lack thereof. Citing the 2019 acquisition of the Tanco Mine in Manitoba, known as one of the world’s few sources of cesium [...]

As pressures continue to mount, U.S. stakeholders are beginning to realize the urgency of building supply chains “that are safer, more secure and not beholden to a country that has multiple human rights violations, predatory lending practices, and vast national security complications.”  For now, however, too often, automakers still have to turn to Chinese suppliers to meet [...]

Followers of ARPN are well aware that China has long dominated the global mineral resource wars on the development and processing fronts, and the United States in recent months has taken a series of unprecedented steps in an effort to decouple U.S. critical mineral supply chains from China. A recent paper published by the American [...]

Geopolitical tensions, Russia’s war on Ukraine, rising resource nationalism in the Southern hemisphere – against the backdrop of ever-increasing stakes it appears that a new theater in the global resource wars has opened up: Cyber warfare, and more specifically, according to Defense One, “weaponized NIMBYism.” The U.S. Department of Defense has announced that it is investigating a recently-unearthed disinformation [...]

It’s that time of the year again.   We’re gearing up to celebrate the men and women who have fought for, and continue to safeguard our freedoms.  It may not feel like it when the cost for the average July 4th cookout has drastically increased, but we have much to be thankful for, particularly at a time when geopolitical [...]